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ABSTRACT 
 
THE TURKISH STATE AS A “NEOLIBERAL LEVIATHAN”  
UNDER THE AKP RULE: 
THE CASE OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES 
 
Şanver, Abdullah 
MA, Department of Modern Turkish Studies 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Ebru Kayaalp 
December 2014, 88 pages 
 
This study focuses on private security companies as a component of the AKP’s 
security policies, which has enabled the Turkish state to extend its dominance over 
the society. The AKP era, spanning over ten years in Turkey, is a continuity of the 
neoliberal transformation that began with the Özal era in the 1980s. As the new actor 
of neoliberal transformation in Turkey, the AKP has implemented the transformation 
in question extensively. Thus, the AKP reign has become a period when the 
institutionalization of neoliberal regime in Turkey has become perceivable with all 
its aspects. In this study, the revamping of the state dominance in the neoliberal era 
is discussed within the theoretical analysis of Loïc Wacquant’s anthropology of 
neoliberalism. The study treats the AKP’s role in constituting the neoliberal 
hegemony as a period that has institutionalized the state control by recalling 
Wacquant’s notion of the “Neoliberal Leviathan.” In this manner, the study links the 
revamping of the state authority with the rise of privatization of the security 
services. The ratification of Law 5188 on Private Security Services enacted during 
the AKP era is portrayed as the step that lays the foundation for the existing private 
security sector in Turkey. Thus, this study concludes that private security companies 
enlarge the state’s capacities of surveillance and supervision.  
 
Keywords: neoliberalism, the “Neoliberal Leviathan,” AKP, security, private 
security companies, Law 5188.  
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ÖZ 
 
AKP DÖNEMİNDE TÜRK DEVLETİ: “NEOLİBERAL LEVİATHAN”   
ÖZEL GÜVENLİK ŞİRKETLERİ 
 
Şanver, Abdullah 
MA, Modern Türkiye Çalışmaları Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ebru Kayaalp 
Aralık 2014, 88 sayfa 
 
 
Bu çalışma, AKP’nin güvenlik politikaları bağlamında özel güvenlik şirketlerine 
odaklanıyor.  AKP’nin Türkiye’deki on yılı aşkın iktidar dönemi, 1980’lerde Turgut 
Özal’la başlayan neoliberal dönüşümün bir devamı niteliğindedir. Türkiye’deki 
neoliberal dönüşümün yeni aktörü olan AKP, çok geniş bir alanda reformlara imza 
atmıştır. Her anlamda AKP iktidarı neoliberal birikim rejimini kurumsallaştırmıştır. 
Bu çalışmada, devlet egemenliğinin neoliberal dönemde pekiştirilmesi, Loïc 
Wacquant’ın neoliberalizm değerlendirmesi ışığında tartışılıyor. Bu tartışma 
Wacquant’ın “Neoliberal Leviathan” kavramı bağlamında, AKP’nin devlet 
egemenliğini kurumsallaştırmasına odaklanıyor. Buna paralel olarak bu çalışma 
güvenlik hizmetinin özelleştirilmesi ve devlet otoritesinin artması arasında bir 
bağlantı kuruyor. AKP döneminde yürürlüğe giren 5188 sayılı Özel Güvenlik 
Hizmetleri Kanunu, hem güvenliğin özelleşmesinin önünü açması hem de 
Türkiye’deki özel güvenlik şirketleri sektörünün temelini atması noktasında ciddi 
öneme sahip bir gelişme olarak tartışılıyor. Bu çerçevede, bu çalışma özel güvenlik 
şirketlerini devletin denetim ve gözetim kapasitesini artıran bir unsur olarak 
değerlendiriyor. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: neoliberalizm, “Neoliberal Leviathan,” AKP, güvenlik, özel 
güvenlik şirketleri, 5188 sayılı Kanun
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This study is based on the argument that the AKP era, spanning over ten years in 
Turkey, is a continuity of the neoliberal transformation that began with the Özal era 
in the 1980s. As the new actor of neoliberal transformation in Turkey, the AKP has 
implemented the transformation in question extensively from health to privatization, 
from education to a reduction of social security accumulation. Thus, the AKP reign 
has become a period, when the institutionalization of neoliberal accumulation 
regime in Turkey became perceivable with all its aspects. In other words, the 
neoliberal hegemony in Turkey reached a state of relative stabilization under the 
AKP rule. 
This study argues the revamping of the state dominance in the neoliberal era within 
the theoretical analysis of Loïc Wacquant’s anthropology of neoliberalism. The 
study treats the AKP’s role in constituting the neoliberal hegemony as a period that 
has institutionalized state control by recalling Wacquant’s notion of the "Neoliberal 
Leviathan". This notion describes neoliberalism as the market-conforming statecraft 
with the intention to impose market dominance over society by the state. 1 
Accordingly, the AKP period corresponds to an era when the state’s visibility and 
dominance is expanded.  
This study links the revamping of the state authority with the rise of privatization of 
the security services. In this manner, private security creates new channels for the 
state to control parts of daily life. It also expands state’s legitimacy as the higher 
authority for commodification of security.  
In Turkey, the ratification of Law 5188 on Private Security Services enacted during 
the AKP era is portrayed as the step that lays the foundation for the existing private 
security sector in Turkey. From this point, the study suggests thinking of private 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Loïc Wacquant (2012) ¨Three Steps to Historical Anthropology of Actually Existing Neoliberalism, 
¨ Social Anthropology, vol. 20, pp. 66-79. 
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security companies as a component of the AKP’s security policies, which has 
enabled the Turkish state to extend its dominance. Private security companies 
enlarge the state’s capacities of surveillance and supervision.  Private security is not 
a form of deviation, but a subsidiary element of the "Neoliberal Leviathan".  
To unfold the above-mentioned argument, in the first chapter, I begin with a general 
discussion on the concept of neoliberalism by focusing on selected critical readings 
about the use of an ill-defined and ambiguous concept of neoliberalism. This kind of 
conceptualizing assumes neoliberalism as an independent power from the practices 
of social actors, and triggers a lack of consensus in defining neoliberalism. Hence it 
causes to a considerable illusion over the explanation of the concept.  
After this general discussion, I focus on what the concept of neoliberalism refers in 
this study.  I utilize Wacquant’s explanation of neoliberalism since his exploration 
provides a well-defined definition of the concept. He portrays the anthropology of 
neoliberalism as polarized between variants of market rule and studies deriving from 
Foucault’s notion of governmentality. Thereby, he proposes a via media between 
these two approaches. According to Wacquant, with neoliberalism, we see the 
revamping of state imposition of the market dominance over society. In this manner, 
it entails a political project that goes beyond the market rule approach. Rather than 
an economic treatment, this approach gives a dynamic role to the state. He further 
suggests that neoliberalism brings not the shrinking of the government, but the 
building of a "centaur state". This centaur state, liberal at the top and paternal at the 
bottom, takes a hypocrite attitude that it shows comely visage toward the holders of 
capital, whereas it is fearsome and castigatory when it comes to ruling the lower 
class which is destabilized by the diffusion of work insecurity and otherness.  
In the second chapter, the study briefly analyzes the historical background of the 
neoliberal transformation in Turkey. Two points are elaborated: first, the neoliberal 
experience that the AKP inherits; second, the AKP rule as a continuity of this 
neoliberal transformation.  I argue that one should also examine to what extent the 
successive governments of the AKP overlap with the neoliberal hegemony in 
Turkey.   
 3 
The third chapter focuses on the link between the Turkish state under the AKP rule 
and the Wacquant’s notion of the "Neoliberal Leviathan". I examine the increasing 
power of the executive branch; the integration of the following three branches – the 
execution, the legislation, and the jurisdiction; the increasing role of mass media; 
neoliberal populism; the using of libertarian themes; and the reconfiguration of the 
security field.  
The next chapter reviews how the state increases its control upon society over 
reconfiguration of the security field. First, I discuss how the perception of security 
has been shaped in the neoliberal period, and I also question the private security as a 
core element of the political instrumentalisation of security. After explaining the 
relation between neoliberalism and privatization of security, the study discusses the 
security policies in Turkey during the neoliberal period. I briefly analyze the 
positions of military and police force in the security system of the Turkish state 
before the AKP rule. I then argue how their relative sovereignty has transformed in 
the AKP period. Finally, I focus on the new security culture developed by the AKP 
in this neoliberal framework. This new culture, a result of successful 
institutionalization of neoliberal policies under the AKP rule, refers to a new 
perception of individuals, so called responsible citizen.  
The fifth chapter focuses on the private security companies in Turkey, which have 
raised after the ratification of the law of Private Security Services, Law 5188, 
ratified on 10 June 2004. In this chapter, I first examine articles of the law, and then 
discuss the relation between private security and the public force. Lastly, I consider 
the private security companies in the framework of the rise of state surveillance in 
Turkey during the AKP era. 
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CHAPTER 1 	  
THE REVAMPING OF THE STATE DOMINANCE 
 
Over the past four decades, the concept of neoliberalism has been widely used in the 
social sciences. A great number of academic studies, conferences, panel discussions, 
articles, and topics use the concept of neoliberalism. It has become one of the most 
popular concepts in the social sciences. Scholars now study the relationship between 
neoliberalism and every contemporary issue in social sciences from wealth to 
poverty, public to private, and cities to citizenship.2  
Scholars use neoliberalism as a main concept in explaining current issues of politics, 
economy, culture and society. It is also combined with the other popular terms of 
social sciences, i.e. neoliberal globalization or neoliberal capitalism. Indeed the 
concept of neoliberalism now substitutes for what the concept of capitalism meant in 
social science analyses previously.  
To sum up, the number of social facts that explained by reference to the concept of 
neoliberalism is limitless: economic policy, law, education, cinema, art, media, 
social policy, urban area design, privacy, sexuality, and so on. Further, the 
popularity of neoliberalism brings different disciplines such as cultural geography 
and political ecology together. The dialogue over the concept of neoliberalism is 
transdisciplinary. It involves "geographers engaging with work produced in cognate 
disciplines such as anthropology, economics, gender studies, planning, political 
science, and sociology."3    
The popularity of the concept in social science analyses reveals a close link between 
the underlying idea that the concept of neoliberalism is a primary and 
unquestionable notion, and a definition of the contemporary world:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Simon Springer (2012) ¨Neoliberalism as Discourse: Between Foucauldian Political Economy and 
Marxian Poststructuralism,¨ Critical Discourse Studies, vol. 9(2), p. 135. 
3 Kim England and Kevin Ward (2007) ¨Preface,¨ in England and Ward (eds.) Neoliberalization: 
States, Networks, Peoples, Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, p. xvii.  
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A perplexing mix of overreach and under specification has accompanied 
the troubled ascendancy of the concept of neoliberalism in heterodox 
political economy. The concept has become, simultaneously, a 
terminological focal point for debates on the trajectory of post-1980s 
regulatory transformations and an expression of the deep disagreements 
and confusions that characterize those debates. Consequently, 
‘neoliberalism’ has become something of a rascal concept – 
promiscuously pervasive, yet inconsistently defined, empirically 
imprecise and frequently contested.4   
 
Concurrently, forceful critiques of neoliberalism have risen in social sciences. These 
critical readings5 offer to go beyond the discussions, focusing on the negative results 
of political, economic, social, and cultural neoliberal transformations occurring in 
the last three decades. They open up the popularity of neoliberalism for discussion.  
These readings criticize scholars who usually put neoliberalism at center of their 
analyses without any question, and accept the ambiguous use of the concept. They 
treat it as something that needs to be explained in particular places and with 
reference to particular people, territories, states and cultural formations.6 
 
Moreover, these critical readings also mention other analytical problems about the 
conceptualization of neoliberalism.  They assert that most of the neoliberal 
literatures make Euro-centric analyses. 7  Accordingly, several Western scholars 
interpret neoliberalism as a naturalized phenomenon that is produced in the West, 
and then exported to the rest of the world.  Thus, neoliberalism is considered as an 
indisputable guidebook to follow, and, the non-Western political geographies are 
positioned as passive receivers of neoliberal policies.8 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore (2010) ¨Variegated Neoliberalization: Geographies, 
Modalities, Pathways,¨ Global Networks, vol. 10 (2),  pp. 183-184. 
5 Catherine Kingfisher and Jeff Maskovsky (2008) ¨Introduction: The Limits of Neoliberalism,¨ 
Critique of Anthropology, vol. 28, pp. 115-126; Kim England and Kevin Ward (2007) ¨Introduction: 
Reading Neoliberalization,¨ in England and Ward (eds.) Neoliberalization: States, Networks, Peoples, 
Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, pp. 1-22; James Ferguson (2009) ¨The Use of Neoliberalism,¨ 
Antipode, vol. 41(1), pp. 166-184.   
6 Kingfisher and Maskovsky (2008), pp. 123-124. 
7 Berna Yazıcı (2013) ¨Güncel Sosyal Bilim Analizinin Sihirli Anahtarı: ‘Neoliberalizm’?¨ Toplum ve 
Bilim, vol. 128, p. 10.	  
8 ibid. 
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These critiques, within the frame of assessment mentioned above, demonstrate that 
the popular use of neoliberalism reveals a reified conceptualization. It assumes 
neoliberalism as an independent phenomenon, unaffected by the practices of other 
actors. Hence, I criticize the conceptualization of neoliberalism which promotes a 
top-down social analysis that neglects historicity, ability of social actors, and the 
existence of a variety of social and political processes.  
 
Critical readings,9 advocate for the use of neoliberalism as a basic analytic tool for 
explaining larger concepts such as power relations and inequality. Hence, the 
purpose of these studies is to re-conceptualize the concept of neoliberalism. This 
approach treats neoliberalism "as a process rather than a fait accompli. And it also 
emphasizes that its rise to global prominence has been fraught with contradiction 
and partiality and subject to limitation." 10  Thus, neoliberalization should be 
considered with other political-cultural formations and governing projects, that 
consider specific socio-cultural formations and political priorities. Consequently,  
 
It is worth noting the degree to which neoliberal policy agendas have 
themselves been transformed through their interaction with inherited 
institutional landscapes and power configurations during the last three 
decades.11  
 
 
After this general discussion, I now focus on what the concept of neoliberalism 
refers in this study. I argue that the popular usage of neoliberalism mentioned above 
is misleading. It is important to remark that the widely usage of neoliberalism has a 
risk of confusion over the meaning of the term, "since the meaning of the term can 
slip in the course of an argument being passed from author to reader."12  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 England and Ward (2007); Ferguson (2009); Kingfisher and Maskovsky (2008); Brenner, Peck and 
Theodore (2010). 
10 Kingfisher and Maskovsky (2008), p. 115. 
11 Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore (2002) ¨Cities and Geographies of Neoliberalism: Theoretical 
Debates,¨ in Brenner and Theodore (eds.) Spaces of Neoliberalism, Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, p. 
14. 
12 Ferguson (2009), p. 171. 
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The contemporary theorizations of neoliberalism, as Springer argues, are framed by 
a false dichotomy between an insurgent approach fueled by loose derivations of the 
Foucaultian notion of governmentality and a hegemonic conception anchored by 
(neoclassical and neo-Marxist) variants of market rule.13 This dichotomy causes a 
lack of consensus in defining neoliberalism. It also prevents a discussion on how 
various approaches of neoliberalism might be gathered together. Springer proposes: 
 
Moving our theorizations forward through an understanding that 
neoliberalism is neither built from the ‘top-down’, as in Marxian 
understandings of ideological hegemony, nor from the ‘bottom-up’, as in 
notions of governmentality. 14   
 
In order to go beyond the problem mentioned by Springer concerning the definitions 
of neoliberalism, I employ Wacquant’s conceptualization of neoliberalism. 
Wacquant portrays the anthropology of neoliberalism as a polarization between 
variants of market rule and studies stemming from Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality, and proposes a via media between these two approaches. I will 
briefly discuss these approaches before I examine Wacquant’s view.  
 
1.1. The Market Rule Approach 
 
The market rule approach treats neoliberalism as an ideological hegemonic project. 
This understanding points at: 
The places and the peoples behind its origins that are involved in its 
apparent uptake in geographically discrete but socially connected parts of 
the world. In this approach political (and indeed cultural) dominance is 
exercised through the formation of class-based alliances – elite actors, 
institutions, and other representatives of capital – at a variety of spatial 
scales, who produce and circulate a coherent program of ideas and 
images about the world, its problems, and how these are best solved. All 
of these are, of course, informed by gendered and racialized power 
hierarchies. Certainly, hegemony is not only about political and economic 
control; it is also the capacity of the dominant group to project its own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13Springer (2012), p. 133.	  	  
14 ibid, p. 135. 
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way of seeing the world so that those who are subordinated by it accept it 
as "common sense," even "natural."15    
 This quote demonstrates the relationship between the power of the neoliberal 
doctrine and its hegemony referring to the idea of ‘freedom.’ From the perspective 
of the dominant group who takes advantage of neoliberal policies, neoliberal project 
is not about imposing a formula, but about ‘willing consent’ by those being 
subordinated. ‘Common sense’ becomes how the subordinate group lives their 
subordination.16 In this manner, David Harvey unveils the charm of neoliberalism, in 
search of the cultural coding of political and economic problems, and the political 
success of talking by using "common sense": 
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political practices that 
proposes that human well being can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, 
and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an 
institutional framework appropriate to such practices.17   
Harvey, in a sense, seeks to understand how the neoliberal doctrine can be 
appealing, despite its contradictions. Neoliberalism as a doctrine refers to ‘common 
values of our civilization,’ ‘human dignity,’ and ‘freedom.’ However, in practice, 
neoliberalization is a "worldwide strategy of accumulation and social discipline that 
doubles up as an imperialist project, spearheaded by the alliance between the US 
ruling class and local capitalist coalitions."18 Harvey reveals the doctrine’s power of 
emphasizing the theme of ¨common sense¨ to explain the penetration and ‘success’ 
of neoliberalism despite this contradiction between theory and practice.             
The turn to neoliberalism, according to Harvey, entails the withdrawal of the state 
from social welfare areas achieved through deregulation and privatization. Despite 
its promise of liberation, he argues, as a political project, neoliberalism aims only to 
foster a good business climate to optimize conditions for capital accumulation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 England and Ward (2007), p. 11. 
16 ibid. p. 12. 
17 David Harvey (2007) A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press: Oxford, p. 2. 
18 England and Ward (2007), p. 12. 
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States begin to perform "the financialization of everything and the relocation of the 
power center of capital accumulation to owners and their financial institutions at the 
expense of other factions of capital"19 towards accumulation via dispossession. 
Neoliberalism as a system of accumulation by dispossession comprises four main 
pillars: 20 (1) Privatization and commodification of all kinds of public goods (water, 
telecommunication, and transportation), social welfare provision (education, health 
care, social housing), public institutions (universities, prisons) and even warfare that 
aims to open up new fields for capital. The privatization has become a basic policy 
throughout the capitalist world and beyond. The commodification of cultural forms, 
histories, and intellectual capital entails wholesale dispossession. (2) 
Financialization refers to how a product can be turned into an instrument of 
economic speculation and predation. Deregulation allows the financial system to 
become the main centers of fraud and thievery. Stock promotions, structured asset 
destruction through inflation, the promotion of levels of debt incumbency, 
dispossession of assets by credit and manipulations have become main features of 
the financial system on the global scale. (3) The management and manipulation of 
crisis refers to the ways in which crises creation, management and manipulation on 
the global scale have evolved into the fine art of deliberative redistribution of wealth 
from poor countries to the rich. Whether floods, wars, or financial meltdowns, the 
structural programs administered by the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex take 
care of any danger in favor of the neoliberal agenda. (4) State redistributions entail 
the state, once neoliberalized, as an agent of the upward redistribution of wealth. It 
refers to reversing the flow from upper to lower classes that had occurred during the 
era of embedded liberalism.  
Within the context of this reigning view of neoliberalism, the market rule approach 
states that particularly the US transports the self-regulation market system to other 
countries around the globe. This is the extension of the neoliberal project that 
captures any reaction against it.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 David Harvey (2006) ¨Neo-liberalism and the Restoration of Class Power,¨ Spaces of Global 
Capitalism: A Theory of Uneven Geographical Development, Verso: New York, p. 13. 
20 Harvey (2007), pp. 160-163. 
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1.2. The Governmentality Approach 
 
Michel Foucault’s approach of governmentality dwells upon how each citizen 
should behave and conduct his affairs. According to this approach, man’s success of 
governing himself determines his capability of governing of his family, which also is 
a precondition for successful government of the state. Thus the approach constitutes 
two different types of continuity, an upward continuity between man, family, and the 
state; and a downward continuity ‘in the sense that when a state is well run, the head 
of the family will know how to look after his family, his goods and his patrimony. 
This in turn means that individuals will behave as they should.’21 
The art of government, as becomes apparent in this literature, is 
essentially concerned with answering the question of how to introduce 
this meticulous attention of the father towards his family into the 
management of the state – that is to say, the correct manner of managing 
individuals, goods, and wealth within the family (which a good father is 
expected to do in relation to his wife, children and servants) and of 
making the family fortune prosper.22 
 Similar to a father’s certain amount of surveillance and control over his family, 
goods and patrimony; the state would implement same practices to monitor its 
citizen’s wealth and behavior. Hence, the family becomes a model of the art of 
government. 
In this context, Foucault states that we live in the era of governmentality that first 
appeared in the eighteenth century. When the sovereignty of single rulers started to 
loosen its grip there was a power-transmission from principality to the emerging 
bourgeoisie class. Foucault emphasizes that this power-transmission enabled the 
family as a model for the art of government to become mobilized on the entire 
population. Besides, he argues that the coming of more ‘democratic’ types of 
government would not mean a decreased need for discipline. On the contrary: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Michel Foucault (1991) ¨Governmentality,¨ in Burchell, Gordon and Miller (eds.) The Foucault 
Effect, The University of Chicago Press: USA, p. 92. 
22 ibid. 92. 
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The need for discipline was never more important or more valorized than 
at the moment when it became important to manage a population; the 
managing of a population not only concerns the collective mass of 
phenomena, the level of its aggregate effects, it also implies the 
management of population in its depths and its details.23    
The concept of governmentality emphasizes the rationalities that are the base for the 
forms of governance. By this word, Foucault means: 
The ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very 
specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, 
as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and its essential 
technical means apparatuses of security.24   
In this way, one of the most urgent tasks is to consider that power is exerted by some 
particular institutions such as local governments, police, and army. These 
institutions transmit the orders, apply them and punish people who do not obey. 
However, political power is also exerted by a few other institutions such as schools, 
media companies, etc. that seem to be unrelated. They appear to be independent 
entities, but at a closer examination they actually are not. For example, educational 
systems are supposed to distribute knowledge. In many cases they maintain power in 
the hands of a certain social classes while excluding several others.  
Foucault argues that the real political task in a society is to interrogate the workings 
of institutions, which appear to be both neutral and independent. If one wants right 
away to define the profile and formula of future society, s/he should criticize all 
forms of political power that are exerted in society.25      
The studies derive from Foucault’s notion of governmentality refers to: 
The ways in which the relations among and between peoples and things 
might be imagined, assembled, and translated, to effect coordination at a 
distance. Both the economy and the state are involved in the construction 
of autonomous, responsibilized ‘neoliberal subjects’. Through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 ibid. 102. 
24 ibid. 
25  Micheal Foucault (1971), ¨The Debate on Human Nature by Michel Foucault and Noam 
Chomsky,¨ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3wfNl2L0Gf8.  
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privatization and personalization, neoliberal governmentality aims at 
transforming recipients of welfare and social insurance into 
entrepreneurial subjects, who may be motivated to become responsible 
for themselves. Such a project of transformation may be based either on a 
social work model of helping, training, and empowering, or on a police 
model of governing every aspect of life.26  
This approach implies neoliberalism not as an economic policy, but a global 
rationality, which embodies itself in the act of governing of populations and people. 
This notion of governing refers to an act that draws its power from strategies and 
techniques for ‘the conduct of conduct’, which refers a form of activity aiming to 
guide, or affect the conduct of some person.27 The governmentality approach claims 
that this global rationality tends to structure and organize not only the actions of 
governing, but also the conduct of the governed.28 Thus, the idea of governmentality 
reflects the variation of the governing acts of the people, whether they are inside the 
ruling mechanism or not.  
Similarly, for Wendy Larner, the optic of "governmentality makes a useful 
distinction between government and governance", and she argues that while 
neoliberalism means less government, it does not imply less governance. While on 
the one hand neo-liberalism problematizes the state, on the other hand it involves 
forms of governance that encourage both institutions and individuals to conform to 
the norms of the market.29 Accordingly, neoliberalism is a technology of governing 
‘free subjects’ that co-exists with other political rationalities.  As a governing by 
calculation, it suggests new relations between the governing, the self-governed and 
the space of administration. 30  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 England and Ward (2007), p. 13. 
27 Colin Gordon (1991) ¨Governmental Rationality: An Introduction,¨ in Burchell, Gordon and Miller 
(eds.) The Foucault Effect, The University of Chicago Press: USA, p. 2. 
28 Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval (2012) Dünyanın Yeni Aklı: Neoliberal Toplum Üzerine Deneme, 
trans. Işık Ergüden, Istanbul Bilgi University Press: Istanbul, pp. 8-9. 
29 Wendy Larner (2000) ¨Neo-liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality,¨ Studies in Political 
Economy, vol.63, p. 12. 
30 Aihwa Ong (2007) ¨Neoliberalism As A Mobile Technology,¨ Transactions of the Institute of 
BritishGeographers, vol. 32 (1), p. 7. 
 13 
1.3. Wacquant’s Notion Of The “Neoliberal Leviathan” 
 
In Three Steps to a Historical Anthropology of Actually Existing Neoliberalism,31 
Wacquant argues that conceptions of market rules and governmentality are defective 
approaches as they obscure what is ‘neo’ about neoliberalism. He insists that the 
market rule approach is "exceedingly narrow, shorn of institutions, and verges on the 
apologetic when it takes the discourse of neoliberalism at face value." 32 
Governmentality scholars, on the other hand, draw a very extensive and ambiguous 
map of neoliberalism, i.e. "overpopulated with proliferating institutions all 
seemingly infected by the neoliberal virus, and veers toward critical solipsism."33 
Wacquant proposes an understanding that is situated between these two conceptions: 
 
This core consists in an articulation of state, market, and citizenship that 
harnesses the first to impose the stamp of the second onto the third. So 
that all three of these institutions must be brought into our analytic ambit. 
I diverge from market-centered conceptions of neoliberalism in that I 
prioritize (political) means over (economic) ends; but I part with the 
governmentality framework in that I prioritize state-crafting over 
technologies and non-state logics, and I focus on how the state effectively 
redraws the boundaries and tenor of citizenship through its market-
conforming policies. 34   
 
According to Wacquant, the anthropology of neoliberalism means "a concrete 
political constellation from a ‘thin’ economic conception centered on the market to a 
‘thick’ sociological conception centered on the state."35 Neoliberalism enables the 
revamping of the state that imposes the impact of the market dominance over the 
society. In this manner, it entails a political project that goes beyond the market rule 
approach, and gives a dynamic role to the state.  
The state is the culmination of a concentration of all political and administrative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Loïc Wacquant (2012), pp. 66-79. 
32 ibid. p. 68. 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid. pp. 70-71. 
35 ibid. p. 71. 
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institutions that control markets. So, the market acts in the direction of policies of 
current political parties in power. To specify this neoliberal reconceptualization, 
Wacquant maps out the articulation of four institutional logics: (i) commodification 
as the extension of the market; (ii) disciplinary social policy that means a shift from 
protective welfare state to corrective workfare state; (iii) expansive and 
pornographic penal policy as a projection of the sovereignty of the state in the 
everyday life; and (iv) the illusion of individual responsibility and the motto of 
culture that concentrate various components of state activity.36   
Wacquant further suggests that neoliberalism brings not the shrinking of the 
government, but the building of a centaur state.37 He propounds Bourdieu’s concept 
of bureaucratic field to grasp the way of thinking of this revamping of the state. This 
concept construes the state as a dissected space of forces that make the final 
definition and distribution of public goods.38 In this regard, the contemporary state is 
traversed by two internal struggles: while there is a battle between the "higher state 
nobility" of policymakers who are decisive in imposing marketization, the "lower 
state nobility" of executants are attached to the protective missions of government. 
The second one involves the "left hand," which is the feminine side of the Leviathan, 
and is characterized by social functions – public education, welfare, etc.- it protects 
and supports the categories shorn of economic and cultural capital. The "right hand" 
is the masculine side, and it promotes fiscal constraints and market discipline.39 
Wacquant argues that: 
I adapt the concept of bureaucratic field to bring into a single analytic 
framework the punitive shifts in welfare and penal policies that have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 ibid. pp. 71-72. 
37 Loïc Wacquant (2010) ¨Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare and Social Insecurity, ¨ 
Sociological Forum, vol. 25 (2), p. 217. 
38 As a concentration of the different species of capital, Bourdieu says: ¨the state exercise power over 
the different fields and over the different particular species of capital, and especially over the rates of 
conversion between them (and thereby over the relations of force between their respective holders). It 
follows that the construction of the state proceeds apace with the construction of a field of power, 
defined as the space of play within the holders of capital struggle in particular for power over the 
state.¨ In Pierre Bourdieu (1994) ¨Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic 
Feild, ¨ Sociological Theory, trans. Loïc Wacquant and Samar Farage, vol. 12 (1), pp. 4-5. 
39 Loïc Wacquant (2010), pp. 200-201. 
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converged to establish the double regulation of advanced marginality 
through supervisory workfare and castigatory prison fare. And I add the 
criminal justice arm –the police, the courts, the prison and their 
extensions: probation, parole, judicial data bases, civil and bureaucratic 
liabilities attached to criminal sanctions, etc, - as a core component of the 
right hand of Leviathan.40     
This centaur state, "liberal at the top and paternal at the bottom, "takes a hypocrite 
attitude that it shows comely visage toward the holders of capital, whereas it is 
fearsome and castigatory when it comes to ruling the lower class "destabilized by the 
diffusion of work insecurity and otherness."41 A "Neoliberal Leviathan" arises from 
struggles within the bureaucratic field of the state that monopolizes each space in the 
society.   
Wacquant argues that the systematic altering of state activities from the "left hand" 
to the "right hand" of the bureaucratic field is an open-ended process. This process 
precedes the growth and glorification of the penal wing of the "Neoliberal 
Leviathan." The expansion of paternalist penalization accompanied by market 
dominance, and the exaltation of both public and private forces, enable the rulers to 
rebuild the state authority. This expansion also allows for overcoming the deficit of 
legitimacy the authority suffers during the shift from being a protective welfare state 
to a corrective workfare state occurs.42 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Loïc Wacquant (2012), p.73. 
41 ibid. p. 73. 
42 Loïc Wacquant (2010), p. 198. 
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CHAPTER 2 	  
THE TRANSITION TO NEOLIBERALISM IN TURKEY 
  
This study treats Turkey under AKP rule as a penal state and views the coming of 
private security as a core extension of the "Neoliberal Leviathan", which "governs 
physical space, cuts up social space, dramatizes symbolic divisions, and stages 
sovereignty."43 To unfold these arguments, one first needs to elaborate on two 
points:  the neoliberal experience that the AKP has inherited and AKP rule as a 
continuation of this neoliberal transformation. From this perspective, the extent to 
which the successive governance of the AKP overlaps with Turkey’s neoliberal 
hegemony also needs to be examined. 
The process of neoliberal transformation required a comprehensive social 
transformation. As mentioned above, it necessitated the building of a centaur hybrid 
state that helped overcome the obstacles in developing marketization and building 
governing institutions. These two lines within neoliberal ideology developed over 
two periods. The first was the Washington Consensus, which lasted from the 1980s 
until the late 1990s, and was a period where a state-controlled "free" market was 
established along with privatization policies. The post-Washington Consensus 
period involved further movement towards the conception of the state’s dominance 
that provided governing structures and constitutional assurances into the hands of 
the holders of power and capital.44   
The historical conditions that smoothed the way for the state’s policies to create 
neoliberal ground in Turkey must be viewed through the lens of the deepening crisis 
of capital accumulation in the late 1970s. The hegemonic crisis which arose in the 
early 1960's because of the rapid development of capitalist policies and the social 
conflicts it caused, resulted in the state not being able to pay its overseas debts and it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Loïc Wacquant (2012), p. 75. 
44 Pınar Bedirhanoğlu (2010) ¨Türkiye’de Neoliberal Otoriter Devletin AKP’li Yüzü,¨ in Uzgel and 
Duru (eds.) AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu, 2nd ed., Phoenix Press: Ankara, pp. 46-47. 
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was also not able to manage the challenges that came from public opposition.45  
The idea to work through this crisis by implementing neoliberal policies was put into 
action when two stand-by conventions were signed with the IMF in 1978 and 1979. 
However, the neoliberal transformation became a state strategy with the January 24 
Decisions. This transformation started quickly with the new restrictions placed upon 
labour and social opposition by the September 12 military coup in Turkey.46  
It is not a coincidence that Turkey turned towards a neoliberal program at the end of 
the 1970s with the implementation of the January 24 Decisions. This plan involved 
decisions that were an outgrowth of IMF-oriented economic programs, starting with 
a currency devaluation of 32 per cent and an extensive economic reform executed 
according to a plan prepared by the then Prime Minister, Turgut Özal. It was a 
milestone in the transition to neoliberalism in Turkey.47 Beginning in 1980, Turkey 
started to experience a neoliberal centralization. The period between the 1980s and 
the end of the 1990s corresponds to the Washington Consensus period, where "two 
authoritarian centers of power, namely the military rulers and the neoliberal 
managerial bureaucracy became the basis on which the neoliberal economic growth 
strategy relied."48 
During the early 1980s, Turkey was one of the countries in which neoliberal 
principles were put to the test. This redesign and construction phase took place with 
the collaboration of the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD. The country became 
more dependent on external financial aid during the major economic crisis of the late 
1970s, which certainly worked in favor of these international economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Muharrem Tünay (1993) ¨The Turkish New Right’s Attempt at Hegemony,¨ in Eralp, Tünay and 
Yeşilada (eds.) The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey, Praeger Publishing: 
Westwood, p. 17. 
46 Korkut Boratav (2002) Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-2002, Imge Kitabevi Publisher: Ankara, pp. 
145-150. 
47 Ahmet Bekmen (2013) ¨State and Capital in Turkey During the Neoliberal Era,¨ in Akça, Bekmen 
and Özden (eds.) Turkey Reframed:Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony, Pluto Press: London, p. 51. 
48 ibid, p. 52. 
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institutions.49  
This change also terminated the ISI coalition 50 (the Import Substitution 
Industrialization strategy) which was then replaced with an export-oriented 
coalition. The domestic coalition is notable because its establishment came along 
with policy transformation unlike the previous phase, which developed before any 
political reform. Establishment of a neoliberal model was easier to design after the 
coup d’état in 1980. The key members of the coalition were also the main 
constituents of the large-scale business community.  This newly designed 
bureaucracy placed them at the center of the neoliberal program which they 
consequently also administered. During the 1980s, Özal became the linchpin of the 
coalition for the first ten years of neoliberal reforms.51 
The Özal government made a shocking impact on the country in just a decade of 
neoliberal policy. However, Bekmen argues that: 
The same impact cannot be claimed for the 1990s. Due to the both 
reconfiguration of the political sphere and the peculiar financialization of 
its economy, Turkey’s articulation to the new course of the neoliberal 
agenda that emerged in 1990s was delayed by about a decade.52     
The reason for secular stagnation during the 1990s can be found in the system itself 
that had been established during the Özal period. First, Özal was a technocrat. His 
urge to establish neoliberalism in Turkey had been justified by the military regime. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ziya Öniş and Fikret Şenses (2007) ¨Global Dynamics, Domestic Coalitions and A Reactive State: 
Major Policy Shifts in Post-war Turkish Economic Development,¨ METU Studies in Development, 
vol. 34, p. 268. 
50 ibid. p. 267: ¨This coalition embodied the rising industrialists of the 1960s, who were making the 
transition from landownership or commercial entrepreneurship to industrial entrepreneurship, a 
process which, indeed had started earlier, under the creeping protectionism of the late 1950s. The 
basic logic of ISI strategy was to industrialize, moving stage by stage to higher levels of 
industrialization without undermining balance of payments equilibrium. The strategy was quite 
effective over the period 1963-1977 in terms of accomplishing relatively high rates of economic 
growth and substantial structural change.¨ 
51 ibid. p. 269. 
52 Bekmen (2013), p. 54: According to Peck and Tickell’s classic definition, the transition from the 
1980s to the 1990s represented a shift from a negative agenda preoccupied with active destruction 
and discreditation of Keynesian-welfarist and social-collectivists institutions to a constitutive one 
focused on the purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes of 
governance, and regulatory relations. Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell (2002) ¨Neoliberalization Space,¨ 
Antipode, vol. 34(3), p. 384. 
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However, after the relative retreat of the military regime in 1987, administering 
neoliberalism was not a matter of vision anymore. Secondly, besides the hegemonic 
crisis during the 1990s53, "the successive economic crises of 1994, 2000, and 2001, 
with last two being particularly devastating, crushed the already weak social base of 
consent for the existing system instituted by Özal."54 In all respects, after the 1970s, 
the 1990s were the second hegemonic crisis Turkey had to bear. In the times that 
followed the crises, the acceleration of the implementation of neoliberal policies, 
which were based on financial liberalization, showed the neoliberal transformation 
in Turkey as a structure that fueled itself with economic crises.55 
It should not be viewed as a coincidence that the Washington Consensus period 
ended with a financial crisis that bankrupted several small banks.56 Actually, it was 
the constant shortage and reappearance of ‘hot money’ in the economy that 
facilitated Turkey’s slide into the economic crises of the 1990s.57  
Unable to keep pace with its debts along with constantly growing inflation, Turkey 
had no choice but to depend on the IMF when the crises hit. But the terms of the 
1998 agreement with the IMF in particular were less than ideal. It did not save 
Turkey from other economic crises. Two big blows to the Turkish economy 
followed, one in November of 2000 and another in February of 2001. Turkey was 
obliged to negotiate with the IMF once again to constitute the coalition government. 
Yet, this new set of adjustments was no less radical.58 
Ex-World Bank employee, Kemal Derviş, was the Minister of Economy and he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 For a further analysis see, Ümit Cizre (1997) ¨The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political 
Autonomy,¨ Comperative Politics, vol. 29(2), pp. 151-166.  
54 Bekmen (2013), p. 55. 
55 Pınar Bedirhanoğlu (2010), p. 54. 
56 Boratav (2002), pp. 151-152. 
57 Şebnem Oğuz (2009) ¨The Response of the Turkish State to the 2008 Crisis: A Further Step 
Towards Neoliberal Authoritarian Statism,¨ Presentation at Third IIPPE International Research 
Workshop, http://www.iippe.org/wiki/images/a/ac/Oguz_IIPPE_Ankara.pdf (accessed 5 September 
2014), p. 7. 
58 Bekmen (2013), p. 57. 
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started structural reforms in 2001. His transformation programme can be expressed 
in three main steps: (1) to create an independent Central Bank; (2) to integrate 
independent regulatory institutions into the system, mainly under the Banking 
Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK); and (3) rearrangement of both public 
and private finance to control debt. Turkey’s telecommunications, energy and 
banking systems were reinforced through the establishment of new independent 
institutions with the ability to regulate the instruments of neoliberal design.59  
The reforms of 2001, in the guise of de-centralization, were actually an epidemic of 
centralization in status, which was different from those of the 1980s. With these 
reforms, new institutions became extensions of centralist regulatory mechanisms 
operating on a global level. Secondly, to keep these institutions intact, financial 
apparatuses of the state were consolidated and further isolated.  The purpose of this 
reform was centralization. It was a means to establish and regulate powerful 
institutions through a regulatory apparatus, all which were compatible with the 
international standards of neoliberal capitalism.60  
Kemal Derviş was authorized to make the amendments for the reform process which 
can be summed up as: "15 laws within 15 days." On the other hand, as the entire 
political order was fractured by the military coup of 1980, political power was again 
to be reshuffled in the early 2000s. It revealed itself with the 2002 elections. It was 
the beginning of a new era for Turkey with the AKP’s rise to power. 
2.1. The AKP Era 	  
The neoliberal policies implemented in the post-Washington Consensus era, 
emerged after crises occurred in countries across Eastern Asia, Russia, Argentina 
and Turkey during the late 1990s.61 The Washington Consensus was impacted by 
Turkey’s economic crisis in 2001 and brought about revisions of some of its key 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Ümit Sönmez (2011) Piyasanın İdaresi, Iletişim Press: Istanbul, pp. 145-218.	  
60 Bekmen (2013), p. 58. 
61 Joseph E. Stiglitz (2002) Küreselleşme, Büyük Hayal Kırıklığı, Taşçıoğlu and Vural (trans.), Plan B 
Press: Istanbul.	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principles.62 The most important difference of the post-Washington Consensus era 
was the extension of the neoliberal reforms which were executed during the 
Washington Consensus, but now included over-market factors. According to the 
ideals of the post-Washington Consensus, state and market are complementary to 
each other and the state is an important actor during the "improvement" period.63  
In this regard, the AKP era, which corresponds to the post-Washington Consensus 
period, is a continuation of the neoliberal transformation in Turkey.64 The AKP 
period in constituting neoliberal hegemony has been a period that institutionalized 
state control, 65  which borrowing from Wacquant’s notion, is a portrayal of 
neoliberalism as a market-conforming statecraft.66  
The AKP appeared at a junction point between the beginning of the neoliberal 
transformation period started in 1980s with the Özal era that was disrupted in the 
1990s, and the mobilization of Islamic movements in the Middle East.67 This 
confluence helped the AKP cultivate significant international support. For the first 
time in Turkish political history, a political actor received the support of MÜSİAD, 
TUSKON, and Nakşibendi communities as well as TÜSİAD and the liberal 
community when it came to power. On the other side, it had political relation with 
some Middle Eastern countries – namely, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar - and their vast 
financial wealth given their oil reserves along with the political clout that came with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Öniş and Şenses (2007), pp. 270-271. 
63 Ziya Öniş and Fikret Şenses (2005) ¨Rethinking of the Emerging Post-Washington Consensus, ¨ 
Development and Change, vol. 36(2), p. 276. 
64 İlhan Uzgel (2010) ¨AKP: Neoliberal Dönüşümün Yeni Aktörü,¨ in Uzgel and Duru (eds.) AKP 
Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu, 2nd ed., Phoenix Press: Ankara, pp. 11-39. 
65 Evren Haspolat (2012) Neoliberalizm ve Baskı Aygıtının Dönüşümü, Notabene Press: Ankara, p. 
196. 
66 This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
67 Examination of this particular confluence detailing the AKP’s rise to power would exceed this 
purview of this thesis. For further details see, Ümit Cizre (2008) Secular and Islamic Politics in 
Turkey, Routledge Press: New York; Yüksel Taşkın (2006) ¨Türkiye Sağı’nı Anlamak: Soğuk Savaş 
ve Sonrası İçin Bir İzah Denemesi,¨ in Ülman and Akça (eds.) İktisat, Siyaset, Devlet Üzerine Yazılar 
– Prof. Dr. Kemâli Saybaşılı’ya Armağan, Bağlam Press: Istanbul, pp. 337-354; İlhan Uzgel (2010); 
M. Hakan Yavuz (2006) The Emergence of A New Turkey – Democracy and the AK Parti, The 
University of Utah Press: Utah. 
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both US and EU support those countries had.68 
The AKP supported the aforementioned economic programmes that were introduced 
after the crisis of 2001. In other words, the AKP period pushed for further 
entrenchment of neoliberalization policies.69 These economic policies after the 2001 
crisis are important to understand why the AKP era refers to a continuation. They 
were characterized by these main action points: (1) to reduce debt, the IMF 
determined a strict fiscal policy that dictated the primary rate of 6.5 per cent; (2) to 
ensure price stability, the government and the independent Central Bank 
implemented anti-inflationary measures to be overseen by the Central Bank; (3) to 
ensure the inflow of foreign funds, which would keep interest rates high; and (4) to 
take advantage of existing global conditions that provided abundant and relatively 
cheap foreign funding, an export-led growth strategy was designed which was based 
on private sector initiatives.70  
Because of this, in the mid-2000s, foreign investments rapidly increased by 65 per 
cent in 2004 and 260 per cent in 2005. In 2006, a 101 per cent rate of increase was 
witnessed.71 As interesting as these increases are, this is also very much connected 
with the AKP's determination of overcoming the unorthodox aspect of Turkish 
neoliberalism, "namely its extremely slow process of privatization: 35 billion USD, 
out of the total privatization income between 1986 and 2011 of 43 billion USD, has 
been acquired during the AKP’s period in office, which foreign direct investment 
constituting 36 per cent of this total income."72  
From 2002 to 2008, the AKP benefitted from the abundance of liquidity around the 
globe, which allowed for it to remain in a favorable position when the global 
economic crisis struck. Also, foreign investments were being made directly as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 For a detailed analysis of the mediating position of the AKP see, Ahmet Bekmen (2013), pp. 58-71; 
Cihan Tuğal (2009) Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism, Stanford 
University Press: Stanford. 
69 Bekmen (2013), p. 60.	  	  
70 ibid. 
71 ibid. p. 61. 
72 ibid. 
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result of cheap credit that enabled businesses the same global liquidity. Actually, in 
this manner, the AKP policies were shaped to be compatible with the EU and its 
economy to be compatible with the IMF.  
The AKP’s main motivation for its "new" approach towards the institutions and 
administrative features of regulated neoliberalism was the global economic crisis of 
2008. Though it harbored a nebulous position after the termination of the agreement 
with the IMF, on the other hand, neoliberalism was so internalized, it became a part 
of the government’s own mentality thus reflecting this style of functioning in all of 
the state’s apparatuses. Moreover, it gathered economic gains and direct influence in 
regards to executive power again. The state used this crisis as a "chance" to reform 
its governance structure and policies.  
The AKP remained loyal to the general laws of the neoliberalization process within 
Turkey. As a constant process that started in the 1980s, this goal was passed on to its 
current standard bearer, the AKP. Along with its role in historical processes, the 
context in which the AKP rose to power also enabled the AKP to institutionalize 
neoliberal policies in Turkey.  
In this chapter, I briefly examined Turkey’s transition into a neoliberal era and the 
AKP’s position in this period. In the scope of this thesis, I will discuss below how 
neoliberalism has reconfigured the state authority in Turkey. In this context, I 
analyze the AKP era as one of the institutionalization of neoliberalization and 
creating a strong state apparatus. 
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CHAPTER 3 	  
THE TURKISH STATE AS A “NEOLIBERAL LEVIATHAN” UNDER THE AKP 	  
 RULE 
 
The AKP era is a continuity of neoliberal transformation that began in Turkey in the 
1980s. As the new agent of neoliberal transformation, the AKP government has 
implemented changes from education to a reduction of social security benefits, from 
health to privatization. The AKP period73 in Turkey has been a period of the 
institutionalization of the neoliberal regime that focuses on the accumulation of 
capital in Turkey, which can be witnessed in all the aspects of its functioning. 
Viewing the AKP’s leadership in the framework of Loïc Wacquant’s conception of 
neoliberalism that I expounded on in Chapter One, we need to clarify the 
institutionalization of neoliberal capital regime. According to Wacquant, 
neoliberalism as political constellation, is a political project that refers to the 
revamping of the state using stratification and classification as a machine driving the 
neoliberal revolution from above. This project, which is different from the idea of 
market rule, which is based on economic pronouncements, features the state in a 
dynamic role. In other words, the market is a political creation, ruled and controlled 
by the state itself. It gathers all political and governing institutions solely in its own 
hands. Contrary to what orthodox neoliberal expression implies, Wacquant suggests 
that neoliberalism brings not the shrinking of the government, but the building of a 
centaur state. 
This neoliberalization process is literally the institutionalization of a dominant state. 
It is during the germination of the neoliberal transformation in Turkey, especially 
during the AKP period, that all of the traits of what Wacquant calls a "Neoliberal 
Leviathan" are demonstrated. Accordingly, this period corresponds to an increased 
expansion of the state's visibility and dominance.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 The period coincides with November 3, 2002-2014. The period in question has not ended yet. As of 
the date this study, 2014 was used as a reference point for the period. 
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Even though the AKP, in the periods before and after it rose to power, claimed that 
it had a different ideology of state, as I will argue below, the evidence shows that it 
had not. The state apparatus during the AKP period was in a position of enormous 
power that enveloped the society as a whole and can be illustrated in a formula that 
includes class, regional and international dynamics. 
3.1. The Increased Domain Of Executive Power 
 
One of the most important effects of the conversion process toward neoliberalism is 
the additional weight given to executive power. The power of the government 
passed to the executive branch from the legislative branch and concentrated solely 
on the execution of programmes - in the hands of the prime minister or the president; 
and usually came along with the emergence of a strong ruler. The efforts that 
reinforced executive power had come from a political mindset whose intention was 
to eliminate the barriers to fulfill the neoliberal conversion and in this way, 
safeguard the enactment of neoliberal policies from any kind of opposition.74  
The first step towards strengthening executive power was taken in the 1982 
Constitution. The 1982 Constitution enlarges the scope of the executive power 
demonstrated in Article number 104, which strengthens the president’s position.75 
Also, the president was given the right to issue decrees. The Council of Ministers 
was given several regulating executive jurisdictions including legislation by 
decrees.76 In addition to the 1982 Constitution, the new 10 per cent lowest passing 
vote for Deputy Election Law77 reinforced the regulatory framework to create a 
potent executive power. 
Because of this strengthening of power, the executive branch could bypass previous 
legislative restrictions and could make regulations. For example, within the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Bedirhanoğlu (2010), p. 52. 
75 Bülent Tanör (2014) Osmanlı Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri, Yapı Kredi Publishing: Istanbul, pp. 
394- 402.  
76 Sonay Bayramoğlu (2010) Yönetişim Zihniyeti – Türkiye’de Üst Kurullar ve Siyasal İktidarın 
Dönüşümü, Iletişim Press: Istanbul, pp. 285-286. 
77 Deputy Election Law, Article number 33: The political parties cannot have member in the 
parliament if they do not surpass 10 percent of the votes in the general elections. 	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abovementioned legal framework, during Turgut Özal’s tenure, a total of 34 
executive orders were decreed. These executive orders provided instruments to Özal 
to "bypass" the parliament and rule over the government himself. This sort of 
authority made the executive branch totally preeminent over the legislative branch, 
and almost creating a separate power.  
Besides, the Deputy Election Law that brought 10 per cent lowest passing vote, 
aimed to prevent democratic representation of the different political affiliations 
within the parliament. 78  These different groups were marginalized as the 
"destructive" left, the "separatist" Kurdish and the "reactionary" right. Using this 
election tactic, Özal came to power by holding 211 deputies out of 400 in the 1983 
elections and 292 deputies of 450 in the 1987 elections. 
During its tenure, the AKP repeatedly strengthened executive power in contrast to 
legislative power. In the elections of 3 November 2002, with a vote percentage 34.3 
percent, the AKP had 363 deputies out of 500; in the 2007 elections, with a vote of 
46.6 percent, it had 341 deputies; and in the 2011 elections, with the vote of 49.8 
percent it acquired 327 deputies.79 The AKP held a high number of seats in the 
parliament which allowed the government to enact any law without any difficulties. 
Parallel to this, it also had the power to prevent the opposition parties to pass any 
bills into law. The distinction between the executive and legislative powers blurred, 
since the party held the majority of seats. Thus, in practice, the parliament started to 
act in the direction of what has already been decided by the executive branch. To put 
it another way, the parliament has become an entity which merely approves the 
government’s decisions. 
3.2. The Integration Of The Three Branches Of The State – The Executive, The 
Legislative And The Judicial 
 
The second implementation in the neoliberal period is to accelerate the integration of 
the three branches of the state (the executive, the legislative and the judicial). This is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Mehmet Ö. Alkan (2006) ¨Türkiye’de Seçim Sistemi Tercihinin Misyon Boyutu ve Demokratik 
Gelişime Etkileri, ¨ Anayasa Yargısı, vol. 23, pp. 133-165. 
79 The statistics are available on www.tuik.gov.tr. 
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accompanied by a decline in the rule of law in favor of personalized regulations.80 
To be able to put neoliberal policies into action, there is a need to increase political 
pressure on judicial bodies. The policies aimed at unifying the executive body and 
the legislative body which was practiced during the AKP period, was intended to be 
established through judicial institutions. For instance, a law was proposed stating 
that if a lawyer was to be assigned as a public prosecutor or a judge, s/he was 
obliged to take a written exam given by the Ministry of Justice (in place of the High 
Commission of Judges and Prosecutors). Even though the president vetoed the 
proposition, the AKP tried to legitimize it on multiple occasions.81  
The policies aimed at unifying the three branches of the state were of paramount 
importance after the 2007 elections when the AKP government reached a majority in 
the parliament that enabled it to make constitutional changes. During this period the 
abovementioned initiatives were proposed, and the judicial reforms the AKP 
government brought to the fore in 2009 were justified under the pretext of  
"integration into the EU." Clearly, the AKP government was working to create a 
judiciary that is dependent on the executive body by making changes in the structure 
of the High Commission of Judges and Prosecutors. It also intended to modify the 
rules of procedures that involved assignments as well as the structure of high levels 
of the judiciary such as the State Council, the Court of Appeals and the 
Constitutional Court.82 The amendments to change the Constitution passed in the 
parliament with a simple majority. The referendum was held on September 12, 2010 
and passed with a 57.9 percent vote in favor. 83   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Bob Jessop (1991) ¨On the Originality, Legacy, and Actuality of Nicos Poulantzas,¨ Studies in 
Political Economy, vol. 34, p. 97. 
81 Fikret Gülen (2010) ¨AKP’nin İktidarda Olduğu Dönemde Yasama Faaliyetleri (2002-2007),¨ in 
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83 In regards to the constitutional changes that were passed into law by the referendum, the High 
Commission of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) became vulnerable to executive power. In this 
manner, when we take into account that the members of the State Council and Court of Appeals 
would also be elected by the HSYK, it could be said that after the passage of this legislation, the 
judiciary too had come under the influence of the executive branch. 
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In this context, Commissar Prosecutor Sadrettin Sarıkaya’s resolution to investigate 
the Secretary of the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) Hakan Fidan is noteworthy. 
84 Because, in context of the law which was passed after this event, MIT personnel, 
(which also includes other commissioned entities and persons, such as 
commissioned courts) who report directly to the prime minister, can only be 
investigated with the prime minister’s approval.85  
3.3. Rising Role Of Mass Media 
 
Another notable factor used in the foundation of government authority during the 
neoliberal process is mass media. Media plays a pivotal role in providing political 
legitimacy on behalf of the government. Moreover, it chooses its agenda from the 
government.86 Truly, in the neoliberal process in question, official media outlets of 
the state, such as TRT, the Anadolu Agency, the Islamic newspapers and TV 
channels, and "central media" such as Çalık, Karamehmet, and Demirören-Karacan, 
all supported the AKP government’s policies. 
Both the agenda and the desired perspectives that the government wanted the public 
to hear, had all been disseminated to the community via the abovementioned media 
outlets. In an environment where the power of media increased and became 
diversified, opponents of government policies are not given any voice in media 
organizations and are only covered by the opposition press. 
The official media corporations, such as TRT and the Anadolu Agency, make news 
on the behalf of government’s policies. These are followed by private press 
corporations such as Sabah, Star, Yeni Şafak, Akit and TV channels like ATV, 
Beyaz TV, Kanal 7, A Haber, 24 Haber, Ülke TV, and Tvnet.  In addition to these, 
media corporations called "central media" including TV channels such as Kanal D, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Habertürk, ¨İfadeye Gitmeyen Dört MİT Mensubu Hakkında Yakalama Kararı, ¨ February 10, 
2012; Zaman, ¨Fikri Sağlar: MİT Kanunu’nda Değişiklik, Hukuk Devletini Zedeler, ¨ February 14, 
2012. 
85 According to this ruling, the prime minister will be the only person that has the right to investigate 
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86 Jessop (1991), p. 97. 
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Show TV, Star TV, Sky Türk, Haber Türk, Bloomberg TV, NTV and newspapers 
such as Vatan, Akşam, Habertürk give considerable support to the government, 
especially sharing government’s vision on the economy, international affairs, and 
employee-employer/union relationships. They, for instance, gave a great deal of 
support to the government on critical internal policy agendas such as the 1 March 
Certificate and the Ergenekon Matter. They assent to every single application made 
by the government and have become the instruments of justification for the 
government’s actions.87  
Furthermore, the government’s control of media outlets has become a salient issue 
during the AKP’s reign.  The ongoing Ergenekon, Balyoz, Oda TV investigations 
which began in July 2007 illustrate the increasing power of government control. 
During this process of the AKP government’s increasing grip on the media, media 
itself became divided into two perspectives which can be classified as "partisan-
oppositional". The partisan side has increased in numbers, whereas the weight of 
"oppositional" media groups has decreased. Besides, for instance, the Doğan Media 
Group was fined 3.7 billion TL in tax liability and had to fire its flagship 
newspaper’s (Hürriyet) editor in chief after opposing government policies. The 
Doğan Media Group was also forced to sell a part of its media empire to a pro-
government conglomerate, Erdoğan Demirören. Another example highlighting this 
case is the sale of Star TV to the pro-government Doğuş Group while firing all of its 
"opposition"-oriented personnel.88 
The government also took precautions against opposing voices in social media. 
Counter measures included blocking access to social media sites used by the masses 
such as YouTube and Twitter, and this occurred on multiple occasions. The period 
post-2007 has been clearly an era of the AKP government’s expanded media control 
and power.  	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88 Cnntürk, ¨Star TV’nin Doğuş’a Satışı Tamamlandı, ¨ November 3, 2011. 
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3.4. Neoliberal Populism 
 
Another distinguishing mark of the state apparatus in the AKP period was the rise of 
the new plebiscite and populist consent techniques alongside a new technocratic and 
liberal legal system.89  An international technocrat, Kemal Derviş who worked for 
the World Bank for years, reformed Turkey’s economy after the 2001 economic 
crisis. In this manner, policies were applied by the  "bowdlerization of [the] 
economy from politics," and had put politicians in a position where they would 
execute demands of only those policies that had a direct impact on their desired 
economic goals. In other words, people had no ability to have their voices heard in 
regards to economic issues. The process in question at first had occurred in the High 
Council which was established in 1981. Without any public or political 
responsibilities, this "new bureaucracy" has created a troubling transformation from 
what had been a publicly and politically responsible bureaucratic structure.90 This 
means that the transformation process was being developed in a way that promoted 
the effectiveness of technocratic corporations through the mechanism of decrees. In 
addition to this process, regulations which included practices such as the election of 
the president by the people, the decreasing of deputy elections to once every four 
years, the judicial reform of high-level courts are examples of their technique for 
disenfranchising the plebiscite.  
As for the techniques in gaining populist consent, they were clearly visible in the 
AKP’s "neoliberal populism" applications: free distribution of school books in 
public schools, enabling citizens with public health insurance to receive treatment in 
private hospitals, and the regulation of green cards whose numbers reached 13 
million.  Social assistance and solidarity mechanisms that brought about solidarity 
with the ruling parting including social programs that originated from municipalities 
and government ministries are just some of the ways that neoliberal populism 
produced consent within the general population.91  	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In this new technocratic frame, the dual bureaucracy system created by high councils 
created opportunities to increase the power of administrative networks. Bob Jessop 
argues that: 
Parallel power networks cross-cutting the formal organization of the state 
have grown – networks which exercise a decisive share in its activities, 
promote a growing material and ideological community of interests 
between key civil servants and the dominant mass party, and consolidate 
policy communities which cement dominant interests outside the state 
apparatus with forces inside at the expense of popular forces.92 
Today’s Turkey, along with its high councils, has a dual public bureaucracy. While, 
the traditional bureaucracy fulfills both public and political demands, the new 
bureaucracy, consisting of high councils, is accountable and responsible neither to 
the parliament nor to the public. 
The fields being regulated by these high councils are:93 the Capital Markets Board 
(Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu); the Competition Authority (Rekabet Kurumu); the 
Radio and Television Supreme Council (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu); the 
Council of Telecommunication (Telekomünikasyon Kurumu), the Energy Market 
Regulatory Authority (Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu) – encompassing 
electricity, natural gas, and oil; the Council of Sugar (Şeker Kurumu) – the sugar 
exchange market; the Public Procurement Authority (Kamu İhale Kurumu);  the 
Council of Tobacco (Tütün Kurumu) – encompassing both tobacco and alcohol; and 
finally, the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu) – 
which includes both savings accounts and accession funds.94  
Because these high councils are not politically responsible to anyone, they attempt to 
exceed their given authority and encroach on the responsibilities of both the 
legislative body and the courts. In other words, the sphere of activity of these new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Jessop (1991), p. 97. 
93 Some of these councils were founded before the AKP period: the Capital Markets Board (1981), 
the Competition Authority (1994), the Radio and Television Supreme Council (1994), the Energy 
Market Regulatory Authority (2001), the Council of Sugar (2001), the Council of Tobacco (2002), 
and the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (1983). The Council of Telecommunication and the Public 
Procurement Authority were founded in the AKP period.   
94 Bayramoğlu (2010), pp. 306-307.	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networks formed by the high councils reached such a high level that it blanketed the 
duties of the legislative body, the executive body and the courts. The board of 
directors of these councils presents a good example of how Turkey’s neoliberal 
transformation has led to unequal and unjust forms of representation. For example, 
one of the seven members of the board of the Council of Sugar represents the 
factories producing sugar (Konya Şeker Fabrikası AŞ.) and another member 
represents companies concerned with amyl-based production, (Amylum Nişasta 
Sanayi AŞ.) The manufacturers are represented by Pankobirlik S.S. Pancar Ekiciler 
Kooperatifler Birliği (Alliance of Beet Cultivators Cooperative). 95  The board 
members are taken from the companies that are directly involved in the industry. 
Therefore it demonstrates a conflict of interest.  
Lastly, the integration of certain liberal and libertarian themes in favor of 
instrumental rationality and technocratic logic is another tool of the neoliberal 
populism.96 Especially after the 2001 economic crisis, the process of reestablishing 
the economy and government, lay in the hands of the recently elected AKP 
government. Although their election represented "public will" and "democracy", it 
applied policies that were mostly determined by the technocratic structure 
mentioned above. Although this platform was presented as within the borders of 
"democracy", it actually serves the purpose of restructuring government. 
3.5. Reconfiguration Of The Field Of National Security 
 
Another development in the revamping of the state has been seen in the increase of 
the state’s control by redefining national security. In other words, this control 
mechanism, was seen in diverse, new constructs in the neoliberal period and made 
its way into the state apparatus reaching new areas which it had not been able to 
access before. 
In this manner, the reconfiguration and amplification of national security during the 
neoliberal period is one of the distinguishing features of AKP rule. This period, 
which included privatization, security and threat assessments, reconstructed the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Haspolat (2012), p. 215. 
96 Jessop (1991), p. 98.	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government as a semantics source and enabled it to control and supervise the society 
on all levels. In the next chapter, I will review how the government increased its 
control over society through the redefinition of national security. First, I discuss in 
general how the perception of security was shaped during the neoliberal period. 
Then, I explore security policies within Turkey during the neoliberal period. Finally, 
I focus on the "new security culture" developed by the AKP under this framework. 
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CHAPTER 4 	  
RECONFIGURATION OF THE SECURITY FIELD IN TURKEY 
 
4.1. Security As A Perception 
 
The concept of threat is usually viewed as an objective fact and not as a constructed 
order. Is it really true? What if, in reality, threat is a constructed discourse through 
everyday control of society by rulers, or a core element of the political 
instrumentalization of security? 
 
In the 20th century’s conception of security, the underlying idea was the defense of 
the state, threatened by other states, based on the ideology of national security. This 
ideology tended to embody itself with a certain distinction between insider and 
outsider security threats. By relying on the release of the neoliberal project, a shift 
appeared from the nation-state towards the market-state.  All sorts of legitimization 
theories according to which neoliberalism means the shrinking of the state authority 
in favor of a self-regulated market are elaborated, and one can read this shift as an 
acceleration of the distinction between the public forces and the security industry. 
Nevertheless, in reality, by the commodification of security, this shift provides a 
new field for the state, which is already stuck in a restrictive and clear sense of 
authority.97 In other words, this new security policy draws its conclusive power from 
the ambiguity of threat that allows the political instrumentalization of security.  
 
Frank Furedi studies the relationship between social control and political 
construction of threat. He warns against the normalization of the 21st century’s fear 
culture that causes the deflation of the status of human subjectivity, and, the inflation 
of the threat that external forces pose to the individual self. Fear keeps people on 
guard against threats to their security. 98  Dominant institutions such as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Evren Balta (2014) ¨Bildiğimiz Anlamda Devletin Sonu Mu? İmparatorluk ve Özel Ordular,¨ 
Birikim, vol. 178, pp. 11-19. 
98 Frank Furedi (2007) ¨The Only Thing We Have to Fear is the ‘Culture of Fear’ Itself, ¨ 
http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/3053#.U39lKi-Nlo4. 
 35 
government, the army, and the police, socially construct security discourses to be 
ahead of public fear. Once a consciousness of threat and fear is institutionalized, 
from this point onwards, there is a one-way ticket to defeat "insecurity" with more 
security.  
To think security threats not as objective facts, but as constructed orders and 
elements of a specific culture or discourse has become very important with the 
growth of the security industry during last fifteen years. Mark Neocleous examines 
the direct relationship between the security industry and the ascending security 
anxiety through exploring the increasing connections between capital and security as 
follows:  
Examining the ways in which both capital and the state benefit from the 
obsession with security, and thereby reading security as the basis for both 
a sustained capital accumulation and a constant political policing of civil 
society, takes us away from the liberal assumptions inherent in the 
public-private distinction and towards a different framework entirely, 
allowing us to focus more directly on the ongoing commodification of 
security.99 
The neoliberal project integrates public assets as new fields into the process of 
capital accumulation inasmuch as they are profitable. 100  The transition to a 
neoliberal state from a responsible social state means that facilitating conditions for 
profitable capital accumulation is henceforth the primary mission of the state. All 
public utilities, at least as long as they bring profit, have been privatized starting 
with the 1980’s. The privatization of security "services" was the latest stage of the 
transformation of the state apparatus in the context of the neoliberal project; 101 it has 
become one of the most profitable, and penetrative fields.102 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Mark Neocleous (2008) ¨Security, Commodity, Fetishism, ¨ Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory, 
vol. 35 (3), p. 349. 
100 David Harvey (2006) ¨Neo-liberalism and the Restoration of Class Power,¨ p. 29. 
101  Evren Balta Paker (2009) ¨Güvenlik Endüstrisi ve Güven(siz)liğin İnşası: Bir Toplumsal 
Paranoyayı Anlamak,¨ Toplum ve Bilim, vol. 115, p. 214. 
102 Global violence organized by hegemonic states, which hold the monopoly of violence, is not a 
tideless or natural phenomenon, but a consisted fact within the process. The supply of violence per 
non-state actors was very common before 20th century. Also, for that period, it is hard to talk about a 
state monopoly over violence or security. In this context, even though, today, non-state actors provide 
the supply of security and violence, it is not in the same way that happened before 20th century. 
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To show the relationship between the privatization of the security "service" and the 
change of security perception as well as the standards of the need for security, Tanıl 
Bora explores two concepts of neoliberalism. The first is the shrinking of the social 
wing of the state under the conditions of fiscal prudence. The other is the increase of 
security anxiety throughout social life.103 In this way, on the one hand, security field 
gets involved in the capital accumulation process, and, on the other hand, state 
increases its domination over society. Accordingly, Neocleous suggests the reading 
of the security industry through the notion of the security fetish. In order to give the 
measures of this idea, it is enough to think of security, ideologically constructed and 
developed, as an interest of both capital and state.104 This tutelary fetishistic view of 
anxiety makes security amorphous and ambiguous. In this regard, Ian Loader refers 
to grasp security as a "whole range of technologies and practices provided, not only 
by public bodies, (…) but also by commercial concerns competing in the 
marketplace".105 The distinctions between public and private security are blurred and 
fuse into networks of institutions and practices.106 Thus with the ‘aura’ of ambiguity, 
security and thereby the number and kind of commodities that can bring profit 
become limitless.107 By the commodification of security, the need for security 
becomes a basic need.  
By making sure that one cannot even think of someone who believes in the 
possibility of a secure space, the security industry reveals the sense that one can 
never be secure anywhere. It renders the idea that being secure is only possible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Because, today’s case refers to a totally new process that involves the integration of violence into 
capitalism and the commodification of security. In a manner, non-state actors have a direct 
connection with the state authority. So, today, the supply of violence and security does not bear a 
resemblance to pre-capitalist period. For a detail analysis see, Charles Tilly (2003) ¨Armed Forces, 
Regimes, and Contention in Europe since 1650,¨ in Davis and Peredge (eds.) Irregular Armed Forces 
and Their Role in Politics and State Formation, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, New York.               
103 Tanıl Bora (2004) ¨Özel Güvenlik ve ‘Polis Toplumu’,¨ Birikim, vol. 178, p. 23. 
104 Mark Neocleous (2008), p. 349. 
105 Ian Loader (1997) ¨Private Security and the Demand for Protection in Contemporary Britain,¨ 
Policing and Society, vol. 7, p. 147. 
106 Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams (2007) ¨Securing the City: Private Security Companies 
and Non-State Authority in Global Governance, ¨ International Relations, vol. 21 (2) pp. 242-243. 
107 Mark Neocleous (2008), p. 349. 
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through consuming the product of security, to compensate for "insecure" conditions, 
which are also constructed by the industry itself.108 The framework of Neocleous is 
well suited to see how, in reality, both the fabrication of insecurity and the security 
paranoia mean endless supplies of raw material, and there is no lack of demand or 
willingness to pay for these products: 
To make a profit, the security industry must sell security. And to sell 
security, it must first help generate insecurities. In so doing, it reiterates 
the central logic around which the national security state is organized: 
that citizens need to be afraid, and need the state to secure them. Like any 
industry, the security industry interpellates consumers as sovereign 
subjects -the customer is king. But it simultaneously interpellates them as 
fearful and insecure. In so doing, it plays a key role in the fabrication of a 
much wider culture of insecurity. 109 
If one reads the market’s logic that paves the way of the security industry for the 
securitization of every aspect of social life, it may help to realize the market is 
excessive. In other words, supply creates its own demands. The market pushes the 
industry to have security experts who can make all the decisions regarding 
security.110 This way the neoliberal project does not reveal an apolitical "consumer," 
but a full concentrated political "consumer".111 The risk does not belong to public 
forces anymore. It is now burdened with individual responsibility, then, individuals 
transfer their responsibilities to the private sector to protect them from a variety of 
threats that flourish via the insecurity discourse.112   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 ibid. p. 50: ¨The security industry aims to turn the feelings associated with (in) security into the 
consumption of commodities. It thus offers a ‘solution’ to fear and insecurity in entirely 
commoditized forms. What is generated is a need for security – a need recognized by capital only as a 
need that can be satisfied by this or that commodity – and so the production of more and more 
commodities marketed in ‘security’ terms. The security industry thus uses its purported concern for 
human beings and their security to reinforce the logic of both security and the commodity form across 
the face of society.¨  
109 Mark Neocleous (2008), p. 350. 
110 Anna Leander (2005) ¨The Market Force and Public Security,¨ Journal of Peace Research, vol. 42 
(5), p. 612. 
111 Zeynep Gambetti (2007) ¨Linç Girişimleri, Neo-liberalizm ve Güvenlik Devleti, ¨ Toplum ve 
Bilim, vol. 109, p. 32. 
112 Marieke De Geode (2008) ¨The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe, ¨ 
European Journal of International Relations, vol: 14 (1), pp. 163-164. 
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It is in the line of insecurity production that the ‘aura’ of security appears to be the 
common benefit for the state. Since the security industry cannot be contained within 
the traditional distinctions of inside-outside, global-local or public- private, it 
requires the dissolution of the ‘state-territory-authority’ alliance.113 The state needs 
security paranoia to expand its legitimacy in the field as the higher authority capable 
of the production of security. Thus, the privatization of the security field ensures the 
continuity of capital accumulation, and it simultaneously enables state authority to 
control social life. Therefore, securitization is the great producer of social control 
that consolidates state apparatus.114  
Louise Amoore calls for the notion of algorithmic security to see this process. The 
move of authorized algorithmic computing applications, biometrics, risk 
management systems, and surveillance technologies, to the private commercial 
world renders an emerging geography of securitization in everyday life. To sum up, 
the result of emerging resonance among security activities "is a stitching together of 
the mundane and prosaic calculations of business, the security decisions authorized 
by the state, and the mobilized vigilance of a fearful public".115    
The concentration of security consciousness and thinking of an omnipotent and 
omnipresent form of threat, encircle any fields both at the national and global levels. 
The urgent priority would have been the precautionary security practices, rather than 
the deterrence policy.116 In this sense, continuity emerges between the individual 
security culture regarding daily routines and the consciousness about extraordinary 
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events, i.e. terror.117 The security fetish dominates every aspect of social life.118 
4.2. The Reconfiguration Of National Security In Turkey During The Neoliberal Era 
 
As I previously stated, there was a transition from a ‘social state’ to a ‘security state’ 
in the neoliberal era. This new state apparatus was expressed by Wacquant as a 
"Neoliberal Leviathan", which witnessed the blanketing commodification of 
everything from education to national security, and was a total restructuring of state 
authority. The reconfiguration of national security is just another state policy which 
highlighted increased control and domination over every aspect of society. 
We must bear in mind that the security sector is the fastest growing and the largest 
market in the world.119 There is a close relationship between commodification of 
security in the neoliberal period and the control and domination of the society by the 
state. This close connection causes a certain paradox. This paradox, produced by the 
so-called restructuring of security by the security sector, actually is rooted in a type 
of security paranoia whose aim is the total restructuring of the state’s authority. In 
light of these policies, the result was an increase in security "openings" and security 
"fears". In other words, by designing a state of insecurity and creating security 
concerns, a centaur state can be (and is) established. 
In addition to the general definitions being critiqued, here I examine neoliberal 
socialization within the framework of the concept of "security". Because when we 
examine how societies are redesigned through the concept of "security", we are then 
able to discuss this self-maintaining and control-oriented state apparatus. 	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In this context, starting in 1980's, "security" entered a restructuring process in 
Turkey. Since the 1980 military coup, expressions denoting violence of some sort 
including such things as martial law, state of emergency, national security, the 
Kurdish problem and Islamic regime, are almost permanent apparitions in the 
lexicon of the state. In this chaotic period in which "security" ended up becoming a 
salable good through the means of privatization and as an outgrowth of the 
confusion and changes brought about by the definition of the modern state, the AKP 
period restructures  "security" and presents a sustainable, new security culture 
through its neoliberal acts of institutionalization and socialization. 
At this point, I would like to present an idea opposing the idealizing that 
characterizes Turkey in the 1990s as a state of security, and accepting the changes in 
the 2000s as a transition to a liberal democracy.120 Because in Turkey, in Öztan's 
words, we are transforming on a much deeper level from a state of security to a 
security regime. 121  A security regime is a mindset that distributes a state’s 
intelligence gathering upon different actors within the security sector. We are talking 
about a regime that increases its capacity to rule by repositioning the army, and 
sometimes, the police force, along with empowering other diverse security actors.  
The AKP period, rather than aiming to remove the political system based on an 
"overly secure" state created by the 12 September military coup, instead adopted the 
mindset of redesigning the political system and sustaining the benefits of security to 
the state. A state with strong national security was constantly being redesigned 
between the periods of 1980 to 2002 and became a different platform during the 
AKP period. At the end of the day, the security paradigm developed and expanded 
by the state’s official security institutions during the neoliberal period was fully 
accepted and expanded upon by the AKP leadership. 
Yet, compared to the previous period, under AKP’s rule, neoliberalism was both 
institutionalized and the commodification of the security industry greatly 
accelerated. This period, in which the perception of an ambiguous threat along with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 This point is being detailed later on this chapter. 
121 Agos, ¨Güven Gürkan Öztan Röportajı,¨ March 28, 2014. 
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the concept of  "responsible citizen" emerged and gave birth to a new kind of 
socialization. Also, this created a period of chaos that resulted from the introduction 
of bio-technological methods used by security forces which established control over 
all living space by establishing mechanisms of domination. The combination of 
private security services with official security institutions, thus expanded state 
authority that resulted in the rise of a penal state.  
To sum up, under both this study’s scope and in an effort to view the big picture, the 
army, police and private security forces are to be evaluated in the framework of the 
state power they fall under. In this manner, (1) I will touch on the security policies 
that were established above the state’s official security apparatus in the pre-AKP 
neoliberal period. I will also discuss the scope of the pre-AKP security apparatus 
and despite their repositioning, the way they served the state’s power in Turkey even 
during the AKP period. Following this, the main focus of this study will show how 
the concept of security evolved during the AKP period.  I will examine (2) the social 
integration of security by clouding the definition of threat; (3) technological 
surveillance techniques introduced during the AKP period as new security tools; and 
(4) expanding privatized security service.  
4.2.1. National Security 
National security is a pivotal concept in Turkey. This concept has historical 
significance as well as a continued importance today, and runs parallel to the 
military’s political status in the Republic of Turkey.122 National security as a part of 
the political sphere gained new facets during the 1980s. On September 12, 1980, the 
commanders of the force that took control of the country were named "National 
Security Council". It introduced a new way of ensuring the military’s primary role in 
civilian politics.123  
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The 1982 Constitution introduced national security as a way to legalize the 
application of the concept of "state’s reason". "National security" was the most 
widely used concept by the National Security Council, as it narrowed individual 
rights and freedoms. The national security approach created permanent effects upon 
society which were not directly related with security at all.124 In this manner, Article 
number 13125 of the Constitution removes the rights and freedoms that should never 
be limited in a civilian society; secondly, political authority had right to limit 
individual rights and freedoms with superficial reasons.126 As a result, we see that 
with the 1982 Constitution the definition and expression of national security as a 
concept became different and every institution of the state was reshaped and 
restructured according to this mindset resulting in the utter domination of society.127  
On November 9, 1983 with Law 2945, the National Security Council (MGK) and 
General Secretariat of the National Security Council reinforced the institutional 
nature of the concept of national security128 and in addition to this, tried to retain 
political authority, which caused the civilian government to weaken. In 1992, the 
public learned that the nation’s security policy, already noted in different laws, was 
going to be codified. The document, known as National Security Policy Document 
(MGSB), was prepared by the General Secretariat of the National Security Council 
in collaboration with the relevant ministries, companies and other institutions, was to 
be treated as confidential. Enumerating the threats against national security, this 
document determines the state’s political agenda for each scenario.129 During this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Meryem Erdal (2009) ¨Anayasalarda Milli Güvenlik,¨ in Bayramoğlu and Insel (eds.) Almanak 
Türkiye 2006-2008 – Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim, Tesev Publishing: Istanbul, p. 35. 
125 Article number 13: ¨Basic rights and freedoms can only be restricted based on the reasons stated in 
the Constitution's relevant articles, without intervening the essence of these rights and freedoms. 
These restrictions cannot contradict the constitution's speech and gist, requirements of the democratic 
society and the secular republic's requirements and principle of proportionality.¨ 
126 Mithat Sancar (2008) ¨Devlet Aklı¨ Kıskacında Hukuk Devleti, 4th ed., Iletişim Press: Istanbul, p. 
146.	  
127 Erdal (2009), p. 36. 
128 National security was defined as ¨protection and overseeing of the state’s constitutional order; 
national unity; all political, social, cultural and economic interests of state in the international arena; 
and the law against all aspects of internal and external threats.”      
129 Özcan (2010), pp. 344-345. 
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period, the state’s perception of threat and security also changed.130 However, the 
definition of social and political reactions toward an enemy power as a collective 
process remained the same. 
In the 2000s, the transition to globalization also had an impact upon national 
security definitions. As the focus turned to civilians, the weight of official security 
actors over the security policies decreased. But in the context of the recreation of the 
state’s authority, official security actors were transferred on to other 
actors/institutions under guise of neoliberalism and turning private. In the process, 
new actors and new actions underlined the state’s domination. As I will examine 
later on in detail, traditional security actors kept their place within the control 
mechanism as the watchdogs of the state apparatus. 
Starting from the 2000s, there were two major changes concerning the positioning of 
the MGK and the MGK General Secretariat. Changes were made to the law in 
compliance with the code of the European Union. First, the Constitution was 
changed in 2001. Within the context of this change, the number of civilian members 
of the MGK increased. It has been stated that the decisions made by the MGK were 
to be taken as advice and not as decrees. Second, a change was made in the Law 
2945 in the year 2003. With this change, three regulations were implemented: The 
authority to oversee the MGK was transferred to the deputy prime minister. Also the 
meeting of the MGK, which took place each month, was set to take place bimonthly. 
Finally, the law allowed the election of a civilian from among the council members 
as the MGK’s general secretary. In parallel to this, the MGK general secretary’s 
confidential regulations were terminated. But, it is hard to say if these important 
changes created any great change. This is because the MGK has continued to 
influence political issues ranging from economic policies to international affairs.131  
After the AKP came to power, there was an updated version of the National Security 
Policy Document dated 2006. This document, despite some changes within national 
security, involved a range of policies similar to the previous document dated 1997. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 This point will be detailed later on in the section of Lynch Culture and Responsible Citizen.	  
131 Ali Bayramoğlu (2009) ¨Asker ve Siyaset,¨ in Insel and Bayramoğlu (eds.) Bir Zümre Bir Parti 
Türkiye’de Ordu, 4th ed., Birikim Press: Istanbul, p. 107. 
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The document asserts utilization of the military in case of internal security threats 
and taking command of the government to eradicate security threats when needed. In 
this context, while the radical right-wing movements were viewed as internal threats 
under the scope of "factors that should be kept under observation", radical left-wing 
movements were blacklisted with labels such as separatist, terrorist and reactionary 
movements.132  
On the other hand, the Internal Security Strategy Document was leaked online in 
March 2006.  In addition to traditional threats, this document also featured topics 
such as illegal immigration and refugees, prisons, civilian violence and. But the 
suspicious things about the document were the topics that fell under "Other 
Operations." Featured in the document were items such as Armenians, Assyrian 
minorities, Greeks and other nationalities, Alevis, missionary operations, and non-
governmental organizations working with foreign-based or international 
institutions.133  
4.2.2. Neoliberalism And The Police Force In Turkey134 
It can be said that as an institution the police force administers the law and in so 
doing extends into every aspect of daily life by establishing the power of the state 
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133 ibid. p. 12.  
134 The police force in Turkey has gone through cycles of being directed by different authorities. But 
under the scope of this study, using a wholistic point of view, the police force has been evaluated as 
being the security apparatus of a strong central state that wished to reestablish/restructure its own 
authority. I used Biriz Berksoy's studies on police sub-culture as a manifestation of government 
strategies and the transformation of the police force during the neoliberal period. In this manner, I 
seek to draw out a chapter which is brief, but adequately enlightening. Also, I will be reviewing the 
police force again under the scope of the relationship between law enforcement and private security. 
See, Biriz Berksoy (2007) ¨Neoliberalizm ve Toplumsalın Yeniden Kurgulanması: 1980 Sonrası 
Batı’da ve Türkiye’de Polis Teşkilatları ve Geçirdikleri Yapısal Dönüşüm,¨ Toplum ve Bilim, vol. 
109, pp. 35-65; Biriz Berksoy (2009) ¨Devlet Stratejilerinin Bir Tezahürü Olarak Polis Alt-Kültürü: 
1960 Sonrası Türkiye’de Polis Teşkilatında Hakim Olan Söylemlere Dair Bir Değerlendirme,¨ 
Toplum ve Bilim, vol. 114, pp. 98-130; Biriz Berksoy (2009) ¨Polis Teşkilatı,¨ in Bayramoğlu and 
Insel (eds.) Almanak Türkiye 2006-2008 – Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim, Tesev 
Publishing: Istanbul, pp. 230-242.  
 45 
which it too is a part. The transformation of the police force in Turkey took place in 
1980s and was a way that the state could shape the public sphere.135 
The police force in the post-1980s kept its militarized mode of operation while 
favoring violence as it does today and also effectively using its surveillance and 
control strategies that came to the fore during the neoliberal period.136 In that period, 
the class balance was readjusted in favor of the rich, both unemployment and 
poverty came to be accepted as normal, and social opposition was criminalized in 
the name of  "power and order", along with the excuse of "national insecurity” 
permanently solidified the control the police rendered.   
Today’s police force follows the state’s strategies which enable it to pervade society, 
and also employs the legality of those strategies as it puts the state’s agenda into 
practice. So, evaluating the police force as a sole entity and taking its mandate as a 
reference point would be to overlook the big picture. 
The state’s violent face, seen in its militarized police force targeting the groups that 
were unable to create a strong opposition, was becoming visible more often. Each of 
those groups was perceived as "threats" or the "enemy within" by forensic policy, 
portraying the total confusion of the system itself. The police force adopted the 
state’s line of thought which thinks of itself as sanctified, creating straw men among 
national conservatives, militarists and some sections of society, and doing away with 
human rights on the other hand. Examples of these policies also include 
investigating and creating police files of Armenians and raids in Roman and Kurdish 
neighborhoods (who came to Istanbul as a result of internal migration - for 
examples, see raids that took place on January 18, 2006, and February 23, 2006).137 
Lastly, the extension of the police authority in the use of force changed in the Police 
Duty and Authority Law in 2007 and is one of the most important points to 
underline. When this law was enacted, the increase of violence and torture was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Berksoy (2007), p. 62. 
136  Loïc Wacquant (1999) ¨How Penal Common Sense Comes to Europeans: Notes on the 
Transatlantic Diffusion of the Neoliberal Doxa,¨ European Societies, vol. 3 (1), pp. 319-352.  
137 Berksoy (2009), pp. 98-130. 
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revealed. 138 This signaled that AKP, which identifies itself with a democratic-liberal 
revolution, rather than transforming the authoritarian governmental structure in 
Turkey, pursued a policy which reproduces authoritarianism. 
4.2.3. Lynch Culture And “Responsible Citizen” 
During the neoliberal period, going beyond its scope of being a legitimate power, the 
state is also an agency that monopolizes both the legitimate and symbolic use of 
power and contextualizes the changes it creates in society under the rubric of 
security. However, the community-policing project, a strategy of policing that serves 
to build a close working relationship between the police and community members, is 
an important contribution to the new security culture in Turkey. 139  
As a means of interpretation, the state is the agent of change during the neoliberal 
period and also imposes these changes in the society. Zeynep Gambetti discusses 
this aspect of the socialization of these changes with the attempted lynching that 
took place in Turkey after the 2000s defined as "post-war violence."140  This 
discussion helps us to understand how the AKP created a new security culture just 
by modifying the state’s existing security policies, which had been in effect since the 
1990s. In the 1990s, the state’s evidence of "terror" used to battle the PKK (The 
Kurdistan Worker’s Party)141 was based on a perception of a certain enemy in a 
certain region. Nevertheless, the increase in violence and attempted lynching in the 
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www.bianet.org. It contains a list of news that show the great increase of violence after the law. 
139 Community policing is one the best examples of this socialization practice. Radikal, ¨Temizlik 
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following years142 began to devolve and shows that the Turkish state made changes 
to its perspective regarding security and security measures and the ways these 
functioned in society. 
The neoliberal period does not mean the shrinking in size of the government, but its 
rise to a bigger and stronger power. Under this framework, the 2000s (or during the 
time when neoliberalism became institutionalized), the Turkish state’s domination 
was preserved and even strengthened and began to create a merger in the state-
economy-society trinity. Privatization of state’s functions, as a paradox, decreased 
the gap between the state and the society. In this manner, after touching on the 
concept of "internal threat" that the state began in the 1990s, I will discuss how the 
state expanded its power with a new security culture in the period after the war 
against the PKK cooled.       
In the 1990s, the perception of enemy changed in Turkey. The perception of a 
strategic threat and national security was redefined. In this period, the Turkish state 
was facing new conditions that were different from those of a conventional war.143 
National borders were no longer adequate in determining the identity of enemies. So 
the Turkish state needed new legitimizing strategies suitable to this new era. With 
the uncertainty of the identity of the enemy, the definition of friend-foe was reset 
with the circulation and description of internal and external threats.144 
By the 1990s in urban Turkey, policies developed generating a need for security and 
the redefinition of crime. The focal point drew on the idea of the criminalization of 
the ‘dangerous’ others, who were portrayed as abnormal and deserving of punitive 
responses. Deniz Yonucu and Zeynep Gönen state that this negative portrayal of 
‘criminals’ is not unique to Turkey. In fact, the neoliberal discourse of crime and 	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security posits this portrayal of provoking and legitimizing violence by ‘innocent 
citizens’ against ‘criminals’.145 This means the Turkish state constructed an internal 
threat to strengthen its authority.146  
In this manner, the Turkish state in the 1990s to legitimize the war against the PKK, 
defined internal enemies as external. In effect, the enemy was neither fully ‘within’ 
nor fully ‘out there’; the enemy became a "natural" outsider.147 In this period, the 
war against the PKK was launched as a by-product of the infiltration by a 
stranger/enemy aiming to weaken the country from inside. This situation did not just 
see these problems examined as a social matter, but also fueled the strategic 
isolation instinct best explained by the saying, "The Turk has no friend, but the 
Turk." 
To fully see how and where post-war violence in Turkey was triggered, it is 
important to make note of its relation to the concept we can describe as state of 
security in neoliberal polity rather than seeing it as ordinary nationalism. After 1980, 
and especially during times of war, nationalism as an idea was a dominant thought 
within the culture. However, in the 2000s, it became a cover for the neoliberal 
transformation of the state as it kept merging with neoliberal social objectives.148  
To comprehend the emergence of the culture of violence, rather than the idea of why 
people attempt to use violence, the right question to ask is how norms cause violence 
to rise within a society.149 In this manner, it is important to review the state’s 
statements about security in Turkey after the 2000s. First of all, the idea that 
everyone opposed to the state in any form can be viewed as a threat and not a part of 	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"us" continued to hold sway. But the slight difference herein was the highlighting of 
a "traitor among us" rather than an "enemy". 
While an enemy would clearly manifest itself, the "stranger" among us, as a 
category encompassing many different elements, increases confusion and 
ambiguity.150 The "enemy" in this manner (the PKK) expands and works its way into 
all parts of a society and becomes faceless. That spreads the sense of "threat" 
broadly. Danger has no more direction and source now; it could come from anyone. 
This uncertainty causes two important outcomes. First, it removes any obstacles to 
the state’s claims of an enemy. Within this simple equation, supporters of the state 
become a natural part of the whole; and opposing forces become "strangers".  
The second, important outcome of this uncertain environment is the promotion of a 
watchman over the responsible citizen. The state’s function as a regulator of the 
society is passed onto civil society and creates a police citizen.151 Individuals tend to 
be more patriotic than the government itself, as they try to follow the government’s 
ideological signposts. Since it can be argued that each of us is only giving an 
impression of who s/he truly is, in actuality any one of us can be a potential "traitor". 
It is the duty of a "responsible" citizen to watch over others, to report in when 
needed and to intervene directly when called for. 
With every attempt at lynching by this "responsible citizen" against any "strangers" 
who opposes the state view, both government and citizen redraw the borders of 
violence. During times of war in the 1990s, violence was under the state’s purview. 
Now the jurisdiction to kill or spare life has been passed onto "society". Individuals 
who ranked as founding members of the state and for all intents and purposes took 
part in governance became the sole carriers of the law. In identifying themselves 
with the will of the ruling government, they also rigorously obey the government’s 
ideology. Thus leading to increased control of state authority by letting security be a 
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matter handled by the public in spite of the fact that it generates its own – and a 
largely unfettered level of - violence.152  
Under this scope and contrary to neoliberalism’s claim that argues that people are 
the subject; the state apparatus keeps its repressive position. People tend to view 
their happiness by how secure they feel. The neoliberal subject, who positions 
security as a value, redesigns her/his life according to the national security goals 
determined by government officials.153 Society is fertile ground for the state to 
reclaim its control because whenever "subjects" maintain the strategies of order, the 
power of state wielded by them in the state’s name is easily concealed. 
Throughout this new culture of security, the hand of the state extends its security 
policies. It secures its questionable authority and its own economic deviousness 
brought about by its adherence to neoliberal market order. During the AKP period, 
alongside the reestablishment of state authority and its institutionalization of every 
section of society, along with creating a "concerned citizenry", the state began 
experimenting with/creating the "Neoliberal Leviathan." The establishment of this 
"Leviathan" was most acutely felt in its use of bio-techniques and the privatization 
of security "service".  
4.2.4. Bio-Administration 
In today’s world, surveillance is a must for a state’s existence. Surveillance has 
reached a level, which covers all of society, and thus, it is at the state’s disposal. The 
Republic Turkey has derived great benefit from this fact, and has acquired neatly 
edited information about its populace.154 But the state’s needs and its tendency to 
expand its network of control have caused a mutation of the characteristics and the 
quantity of this information. The system of gathering information from the populace 
underwent a transformation during the 2000's when the state started using new 
political means and technologies to gather the aforementioned information. In this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 ibid. p. 20. 
153 ibid. p. 27.	  
154 Ferhunde Özbay (2010) ¨Türkiye’de Ulus-devlet, Gözetim ve Nüfus Bilgisi,¨ Toplum ve Bilim, 
vol. 118, p. 167. 
 51 
manner, starting with a pilot study in 2007, an electronic ID card system was a 
crucial step in the merging of all the other previous systems creating one unified 
whole.155  
In the year 2000, citizenship numbers (ID numbers) were introduced and became 
obligatory not just for official business, but to define an individual within every 
political, administrative and commercial network. In this manner, the period 
following the 2000 census points to a change in the approach of population tallying 
and classification. This approach aimed to replace the census-based system with a 
registry-based system. The main database concerning the population was to be a 
registry instead of a census. The main point to note here is that it is possible to 
merge the data coming from the registry system with an individual’s personal 
information with the ability to track the data using an individual’s profile.156  
In this case, Turkey followed the EU concerning the identity registration system and 
took steps accordingly. In terms of population statistics, these steps resulted in two 
main transformations. The first was the standardization of classifications and 
definitions, thus determining the type of data to be gathered as well as the 
institutions that would process it. The other change was about the method of getting 
information of population. The data began to collect from the registry system. Thus 
enabling up-to-date individual data flow without having to wait for a census. The 
information gathering techniques, which had been dependent on statistics measured 
by geographical units, developed into a means of tracking an individual data.157  
In 2002, as a part of this transformation, citizenship numbers were put online by the 
Central Population Administration (MERNİS). In other words, the registry office 
became digital and information was digitized. Since 2005, the gathering of statistics 
in both national and international level came with Law 5429158, which determined 	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which institutions were responsible for the different areas of information. The 
process began under the auspices of the Official Statistics Program. 
Moreover, the National Address Database, which was established between the years 
of 2006-2007, and Address Based Population Registry System (ADNKS), 159 
synchronized the population with data concerning their address. This data has also 
become a source of information for other systems. In a side note, the Turkish 
government collaborated with the EU on this project.  
Official ID cards are the sole basis of the state-citizen relationship. ID numbers have 
a key role in forming the discipline-control-surveillance network. This system 
controls individual data, enables the system to establish bases on any grid rather than 
creating a singular centralized presence.160 In other words, today there is no one 
single operator in a certain grid but many grids in which an operator may be found. 
This enables the tracking of individual data from multiple bases, while increasing 
the feeling of being followed, and it also increases the amount and variation of data 
that can be tracked with a potential to escalate the systems’ overall efficiency in 
finding examples of transgression. As we see in Turkey, ID numbers do not just 
connect each and every personal data network, they also make the data trackable and 
controllable from anywhere without needing a centralized control point.161  
Apart from ID numbers, there have been two major adjustments to the ID cards. 
First, a new law in 2006 stated that people were no longer obliged to indicate their 
religious views on their IDs. This change was based upon the constitution. The 
article number 24 states "No citizen can be forced to declare his/her religious beliefs 
to the government." However, this inclusion in the citizen’s identity cards violates 
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religious liberty in Turkey, 162 particularly under a ¨neutrality¨ conception of that 
right.163  
Secondly, biometric ID cards were introduced following a pilot study completed in 
November 2010. This is what is known as a "smart card". Its aim is to replace every 
other card such as the driver’s license, health certificate and social security card. A 
chip on the card stores chosen population data. As a biometric security measure, it 
also stores fingerprint data. The card also has a six-digit passkey.164  
Digital ID cards have basic information about the individual and the ID number 
written on it. Yet, the card does not include such data as the whereabouts of the 
individual’s local registry. While the card can store a significant amount of 
information through the aid of the chip without the need for written information, 
(and also with the activation of ADNKS), the individual’s regional reference point is 
no longer based on their official registry office, but on their permanent residence. 
Thus, family ties don’t have as much significance anymore, the reference point 
becomes where the individual lives, studies or consumes, aided by the places that are 
integrated into the system.165 Another interesting fact is that the card also contains 
its owner’s signature on it. This is just one more confirmation of the individual’s 
participation in the system and it also verifies other activities embarked on 
domestically and abroad. 
Lastly, biometric ID cards are digitally and physically compatible with other smart 
cards used in other countries.166 Therefore, these cards are already functioning 
internationally. 
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4.2.5. Privatization Of Security 
As we have examined in the Chapter "Security as a Perception", the precautions we 
have used to remedy our "insecurity" are based on political and historical 
considerations. Today, the security industry is one of the biggest and most profitable 
sectors. The income derived globally from this sector was 55.6 billion USD in the 
1990s and reached 100 billion USD in the year 2000. The total income from the 
sector was approximately 200 billion USD in 2010.167  
The growth of private security means not only that the state authority has secured its 
dominance by influencing private security agents within society, but also by 
producing a new security culture. This new culture feeds a feeling of insecurity that 
a person can avoid only through more security precautions that are no longer 
procured only by the state, but also through private security organizations.168 In this 
manner, security becomes a real need for people, who feel insecure. 
The need for security is the determining factor for the commodification of security 
as it creates customers. Nevertheless, we can view the process in the opposite 
direction as well. The triggering factor for this need is the growth of the security 
sector. The accelerating supply of various security services triggers fear and the 
feeling of insecurity, thereby convincing the customer there is an increase in the 
crime rate and there is a need for more security.169 To sum up, commodification 
works hand in hand with the intensification of the division, polarization, and 
fragmentation of urban space. For instance, the AKP as the agent of the neoliberal 
agenda in Turkey, mutes the voice of opposition groups against the state ideology by 
defining them as ‘others.’ An example of this is the neoliberal urban transformation 
project that engages in a basic form of gentrification that ‘eliminates problem areas’ 
and has been a project involving marginalization and exclusion.170 	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On the other hand, the security industry’s integration into capitalism must be 
understood not just as the privatization of security services, but also as a wider 
process. Privatization of security has caused a separation of security practices 
distinct from official authorities and parallel to this, resulted in the redefinition of 
private and official security services. But as revealed in practice, the privatization of 
security services are just new channels for the government to control every part of 
daily life as the sector is commoditized. 
As this study demonstrates, the direct result of commodification of security as a 
sector was the deepening of feelings of insecurity and the increasing of official 
security expenses rather than a decrease of those expenditures. Following this, the 
differences between internal and external security as a concept no longer existed 
after 1990s. Today, the perception of security has been reestablished. The 
implementation of new surveillance technologies and tracking systems gives more 
control to the state in this new security culture environment and has made the state’s 
existence noticeable in all aspects of daily life. Thus, in this culture, the state spreads 
its own security concerns to society. According to this way of thinking, the threat 
has no concrete definition and can now arise from any place at any time. 
Private security companies are entities that not only rely on existing feelings of 
insecurity, but also create new areas of insecurity. In the following chapters, after a 
short examination on how private security companies develop globally, I will 
evaluate private security companies in Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 5 	  
PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES 
 
5.1. An Overview Of The Privatization Of Security 
 
There has been a remarkable increase in the proportion of private security 
companies since the late 1970s in the United States and the Europe. This is a result 
of the neoliberal transformation process in the centralized nation-states that portrays 
security as a commodity endowed with market value. According to the most basic 
idea of neoliberalism, which tends to read the privatization of security as the coming 
of a small government, the provision of security by private or non-state actors is a 
unique phenomenon for the last quarter of the 20th century. Nevertheless, the 
monopoly of the state over use of force is an exception in world history, rather than 
a rule.171  
In the period when the states could not constitute regular armies, mercenaries 
enabled the states to have non-state security forces for their need of soldiers during 
war. To provide force by private and non-state actors was a routine practice of both 
global and national levels before the 20th century.172 Especially after the Westphalia 
order in 1648, the idea that states are providers of security during war became 
important.173 To sum up, until the last quarter of the 20th century, one could talk 
about the existence of private providers for security, and during the period between 
the 18th century and the late 1970s, it was a fact that states slowly monopolized 
security.  
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Today, however, the idea of security has been superseded by a much more complex 
reality. We have to think of it together with the ideology of neoliberalism. Yet, the 
regulation of the provision of security through neoliberal policies does not imply the 
emergence of a small government.174  
5.2. Private Security Companies In Turkey 
 
In Turkey, one should treat the growth and development of the private security 
sector as the resurgence of state authority over security issues. This inclusive 
argument unfolds with the emergence of private security as a key figure dealing with 
daily life public order cases and the accelerating increase of the state’s concentration 
on terror and anti-state movements.  
This given role to external actors in means of providing security is a part of 
neoliberalism itself. It is also an inherent part of information based ruling 
mechanism, which reorganizes authoritarian relations in the society. This 
mechanism is developed to control and direct individuals and to enable a direct 
assumption by state’s official apparatuses. Consequently, it is the state process of 
consolidation of itself through new actors; this is a fundamental transformation of 
the neoliberal state’s definition of a traditional state.175 The commodification of 
security after 1980 should be evaluated as a process in which the state reestablishes 
its own authority. 
5.2.1. Law 2495 
Following along the lines of the socio-political turbulence of the 1970s in Turkey, 
¨bank squads¨ a quasi-formal arrangement made between banks and the police 
department, were created as a solution arising from the need for private security. 
During that period, banks donated cars to the police department that were 
specifically used for the bank’s own protection and security. Hiring retired 
policemen or military officers to their board of directors, was another way that banks 	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gained the right to have armed personnel on their premises.176  
However, the security sector came to the fore only after the ratification of Law 2495, 
the Law for the Protection and Securing of Some Institutions, on the 22nd of July 
1981,177 which allowed strategic public and private institutions to found their own 
security units. The law thereby created a number of provisions for private security 
endeavors in Turkey. Parallel to the emergence of neoliberalism as a dominant 
ideology around the world, private security companies increased and became a 
market endeavor. 178  The increased numbers of attacks in eastern and the 
southeastern Anatolian regions in the 1990s, and the assassinations that caused fear, 
such as the Özdemir Sabancı case,179 kept matters of security on the agenda and 
caused a flourishing private security service culture.180 
Law 2495 highlighted the pre-1980’s violent political environment as an excuse for 
its inception and stated that the ones who had attempted to weaken and destroy the 
state would attack the institutions that had been formed at great cost and man power 
to damage the state’s wide-ranging development ventures. Because of this statement, 
the institutions in question were obliged to take "more effective security" measures. 
In this manner, Law 2495 runs parallel with the mindset that formed the 1982 
Constitution. 181  Consequently, in an environment of separatist and destructive 
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actions, a forensic groundwork which justified "security measures" was laid out.182  
Article number 1 of this law states that companies that are public or private 
institutions can found a private security organization for certain purposes. The 
institutions and companies covered by the law are defined as follows: (1) having a 
significant contribution to the national economy or the state’s defense capabilities, 
(2) the institutions and companies whose damage or collapse (partially or totally) or 
who would be temporarily disabled would have a negative impact on national 
security, the national economy and on society. The companies and institutions fitting 
this description are authorized to establish a private security organization according 
to these reasons: (1) these institutions and companies can defend themselves against 
the threats of sabotage, arson, theft, vandalism, looting or destruction; (2) prevention 
of the removal by force of their employees and to preserve their health/bodily 
integrity from the threats/dangers in question. Also, international entry and departure 
points like customs houses, airports, and harbors are covered by this law. Entry and 
departure procedures including document checks at these locations are to be handled 
by these private security units. The law also ensures that individuals whose entry 
and/or departure from the country are prohibited can be detained. 
According to Law 2495, the companies and institutions that can benefit from private 
security services are: "the Ministry of Education, dams, power plants, refineries, 
power lines, oil lines, depots, loading facilities and similar places which make a 
significant contribution to the economy and the government’s military defense 
strategy, as well as airports and harbors open to civilian traffic and historic relics, 
ruins, protected areas and museums as well as industrial, commercial and tourist 
facilities." (Article number 2) 
Furthermore, Law 2495 indicates the purpose and sphere of service as follows: 
private security organizations are to be established within the aforementioned 
company and institutions (Article numbers 3, 8), thus limiting the scope of their 
duties within the confines of these companies’ sphere of activity (Article number 
11). The Council of Ministers is assigned as the regulator of these entities, and also 	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in regards to the kind of security measures to be taken within these institutions 
and/or if it is necessary or not to establish a security organization (Article number 3) 
and in the case of the abatement of these needs, to duly terminate these security 
entities (Article number 6). In addition to this, the law states that individuals on duty 
in private security organizations are to be counted as officials when applying the 
Turkish Penal Law, and persons acting against them are to be penalized as if they 
had attempted a crime against state officials (Article number 13). 
When evaluated together we can state that with all its articles, Law 2495 considers 
private security as a part of general security. Private security organizations are not 
considered to be an organization rivaling the police department, which is responsible 
for domestic security, and their formation and termination at any time depends on a 
decision by the Council of Ministers. Under this framework, the main duties of 
internal security as well as their secondary duties are shared between the police 
department and any private security organization to be formed. Consequently, while 
the police department ensures internal security through their general duties; the 
secondary responsibilities, such as the security of private places such as factories, 
banks, bazaars, historical and tourist areas are to be fulfilled by private security 
organizations.183  
In addition to the private security organizations established by Law 2495, another 
development occurred within the private security sector. Some bogus companies 
were established as commercial companies to look like cleaning or consulting firms 
and began to meet the needs of various private institutions which were not covered 
by the law, but who still felt the need for "private security." These firms were under 
the scope of Turkish Trade  (TTK) and Debt Law, and were established as 
commercial companies that sold "security services" to their clients.184  
The private security organizations that fell under the scope of Law 2495 were 
established to protect and provide security to the institution to which they were 
connected. During the AKP period, Law 2495 was repealed and it was replaced by 	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Law 5188 and it enabled the establishment of private security companies that also 
operated out of their linked institutions. 
5.2.2. Law 5188 
During the time Law 2495 was enforced (which covered a period of more than 20 
years), security in Turkey became more commercial and more market oriented. 
Accordingly, the supply of private security services in Turkey increased at an 
unprecedented rate.185 The passage of a comprehensive law regarding the private 
security sector had to wait until 2004. This law was the Law for Private Security 
Services, Law 5188, and it was passed on the 10th June 2004.186 
 
Law 5188 principally clarifies these topics:187  
(1) Every company and individual serving in the private security sector is to be 
registered. Persons, buildings, and facilities will be covered and benefit from 
private security services and will involve the protection of possessions and 
transfers of cash. This will mean that the private security sector will be 
equipped with advanced technological equipment and instruments. 
(2) The establishment of security services is the juncture between general and 
private security. The assignment of tasks has already been determined and 
the public arm (police department) has been given the duty of supervising 
and regulating private security. Any companies or private educational 
institutions that are suspected of operating outside their scope or are sources 
of unlawful activity are to be decommissioned. The founders and chief 
executive officers of the companies that have been shut down resulting from 
these violations will never be allowed to establish or manage any other 
private security companies or private security training facilities. 
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(3) As a rule, private security personnel are to serve unarmed unless it is 
necessary in special circumstances. 
(4) All vested rights of private security organizations are based on Law 2495 
and their current employees are reserved for 5 years starting with the law’s 
enactment. At the end of the fifth year, licenses are to be renewed and 
security personnel are also obliged to receive re-training in order to keep 
their qualifications current. 
(5) The companies offering security services that are not covered by Law 2495, 
but based on Trade Law are to be allowed to keep operating if they perform 
certain required duties after 6 months of the regulation’s enactment. 
Under the general scope of Law 5188, I will examine and evaluate the position of 
private security companies. But first, it would be beneficial to discuss the articles of 
law so as to be able to examine the upturn in profits of private security companies 
after the enactment of the law. Law 5188 laid the foundation for the existing private 
security sector in Turkey. Law 5188 permits the provision of private security 
companies to regulate their own licensing and supervision of their own institutions 
and the people who would provide this service (Article number 2). The law formally 
founds the field, and defines how this new public service will be provided; it also 
names the participants, and delimits their actions. It defines methods to be followed 
in order to establish a private security unit (Article numbers 3-4), or a private 
security company (Article number 5). This law defines the responsibilities of 
security guards, under which conditions they are allowed to carry and use their 
firearms, and their line of duty (Article numbers 7-9). It also specifies the conditions 
on becoming a security guard (Article numbers 10-14). 
The general preamble of Law 5188 states that one of the most important duties of 
the state is to provide security for the public. An individual has the right to protect 
her/his life and property. This right is given to a person who wants to obtain 
protection for herself/himself in addition to the general security that is provided by 
the state. No doubt, this overarching framework is supported by everyone in the 
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private security sector.188 This legal framework enables considerable growth in the 
security market and favors those in the private security sector – for example, private 
security companies and security guards. This legislative framework also shows the 
neoliberal mindset of governance, which instrumentalizes individual enterprise.189 
Before the ratification of Law 5188, the private security sector had already become 
significant. The number of private security guards was about 100,000, and there 
were approximately 500 private companies in the field. After the 2004 law, there 
was a significant increase in the number of private security companies and schools, 
and private security guards.190 As of March 2014 in Turkey, the number of locations 
authorized to have private security was 65,187. There are 640,475 private security 
guards who have been given identity cards. 460,073 guards are in the private 
security sector. The same source has 1,325 companies and 565 private schools in the 
field of policing. Additionally, there are 29 companies and 8 private schools in the 
gendarmerie.191 These numbers prove the rapid growth and development of the 
private security sector in Turkey. 
5.2.3. The Nexus Of Private Security And The Public Force 
According to the third article of Police Force Law 3201,192 the public force has 
authority across the country and it encompasses the gendarmerie, the police force 
and coast guards. In the same article, besides the public force, the forces formed by 
special law and with relatively limited jurisdiction that operates in their predefined 
areas are defined as the private security force.  
Considering the existing legislation, it is not possible to fit private security units, 
organizations and companies in a certain manner. Law 5188 and its related 	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  Law 3201 concerning the Police Force, published in the Official Gazette no. 3629, dated 12 June 
1937.	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regulations do not include a statement which lists the exponentially-growing private 
security companies as official forces.193 The first article of Law 5188 clearly states 
that "the purpose of this law, is to determine the main regulations and practices of 
private security services which is a complementary element of public security." This 
underlines private security services’ "complementary" function to public or general 
security. The article also does not clarify the term ¨public security¨ when it mentions 
public security.   
As is generally acknowledged, public security is a type of security whose aim is 
keeping a society secure and whose objectives are to be provided by public security 
forces and as a service benefits society. Services are to be run by either public 
institutions or by specialists who are under strict supervision by related public 
institutions.194 In this manner, it is neither the gendarmeries’ nor the police’s duty to 
perform private security service or to provide oversight to private clients or protect 
private property, which is regulated by Law 5188. According this law, private 
security services, by maintaining the security of private property, indirectly 
contribute to public security. Consequently, any other areas that are not a matter of 
public security or its extensions, are "open" and fall under the larger (private) scope 
of the security field.195  
Moreover, private security guards, as they attend to their legal duties are authorized 
to give aid to public forces, and also have the same jurisdiction of public forces for 
the crimes attempted against them.196 They are also prohibited to go on strike or 
resign en masse in order to prevent the disruption of public order, which could occur 
in their absence. 
All these regulations, when evaluated with the private force’s obligation to be 
audited by the public force as stated in Law 5188 in numerous articles, seem to 
cloud the distinction between the private security sector and the public force. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Atılgan (2009), p. 263.	  
194	  Şeref Gözübüyük (1997) Yönetim Hukuku, Turhan Press: Ankara, p. 245.	  
195 Haspolat (2012), p. 227.	  
196 Law 5188, Article 23.	  
 65 
5.2.4. Duties And Jurisdictions Of Private Security Guards, And The Police Society 
Private security personnel mingle in public wearing their uniforms that are similar to 
those of the police and are in yet similar roles, also undoubtedly increase the effect 
and quantity of policing personnel in daily life. In their uniforms, they are authorized 
to use force to protect private property and private interests. 197  The physical 
appearance of private security guards within every field of life shows us that 
contrary to assumptions, the state’s capacity to control and supervise daily life has 
increased. 
There are no obvious differences between the scope of service of private security 
services and the public force in fact and in practice. According to official discourse, 
private security guards have jurisdiction only during their working hours and only at 
their place of employment. It also states that these hours and areas can be 
determined by examining their hours under contract.198 But, in reality, private 
security guards are called upon to act in cases where there is a need by public forces 
to preserve public security, even if the duty call is out of their area.  
Private security personnel may be assigned to duties of preserving public security by 
local authorities.199 Many official institutions in Turkey are secured and protected by 
private security companies. Countrywide, municipalities that have a difficult time 
recruiting law enforcement officers increasingly benefit from the services of private 
security companies. All these applications are indicators of the growing area of 
private security organizations’ scope of duty, which includes unspecified areas of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Tanıl Bora (2007) ¨Güvenlik Alanının Özelleşmesi: Gariba ‘Emniyet’, Kibar Muhitlere ‘Özel 
Güvenlik’ Mi?¨ İstanbul Dergisi Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, vol.59, p. 61.	  
198 Eryılmaz (2006), p. 127.	  
199 According to Law 5188, Article 13: Local authorities may claim the right to apply and supervise 
private security measures to preserve peoples’ lives and possessions. They can ensure security as well 
as social freedoms and can also request changes to the procedure for security measures taken 
previously or take additional measures and/or ask for suspension of the measures that are beyond the 
private security personnel's jurisdiction. (...) In a state of disturbance of the public order, private 
security personnel and overseers are to inform the gendarmerie immediately. When it is understood 
that peoples’ lives and possessions are/will be in danger in an area protected by private security, local 
authorities are to task the gendarmerie. At such a time, private security personnel will be under the 
command of local authorities and the chief of the public force.	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private domain along with the state’s official institutions.200  
According to the view that defends a very limited area of scope for private security 
guards, Law 5188 gives them jurisdiction 201  only for activities fall under 
"prevention." In other words, these authorities are complementary to the "service of 
security" provided by state’s own official security personnel. Consequently, private 
security personnel can "borrow" the powers of the public force only to justify their 
work.202 But in circumstances lacking the audits anticipated by the regulations, 
private security guards often tend to exceed their authority and violate individual 
rights and freedoms. 
The auditing of the private security sector is a bit of a puzzle even though the law 
regulates it.203 The underlying reason behind the misuse of authority among security 
guards stems from the perception which makes them to think they are sort of police 
force. A great number of examples confirm this perception. Certain cases are 
described below: 
Ahu and Murat Dindar are a married couple who were attending a 
Ramazan Festival held in Karaalioğlu Park. With them was their disabled 
daughter Armağan Dindar (aged 13) seated on the back seat of their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200	  Atılgan (2009), p. 264.	  
201 According to Law 5188, the mandates of private security personnel are: (1) to have visitors walk 
through metal detectors and into the designated areas they are posted to watch, to scan visitors’ 
bodies for unauthorized possessions, to place visitors’ belongings through x-ray or similar security 
devices, (2) to check IDs, at conventions, concerts, sporting events, stage shows and similar events as 
well as funerals and weddings, (3) According to 127th Article of Criminal Court Process Law (CMK) 
1412 no. (90. Article of the current CMK), to search a suspect in relation to their arrest, (4) to search 
for and arrest individuals that currently have an outstanding arrest warrant or conviction, (5) during 
natural disasters such as fires and earthquakes, if a distress call is received, to enter buildings, houses 
and shops falling under their purview, (6) to request IDs at public transportation centers such as 
airports, harbors, stations and terminals and to use metal detectors to scan visitors’ bodies for 
unauthorized possessions, to place visitors’ belongings through x-ray or similar security devices, (7) 
to inform the gendarmerie immediately of the seizure of any possessions during their search which 
are illegal, evidentiary or non-evidentiary, but dangerous, (8) to take abandoned or found possessions 
into custody, (9) to take an individual into custody to protect him/her from immediate danger, (10) to 
arrest an individual and to guard a crime scene and evidence according to Article no. 157 of CMK 
(according to Article no.168 in the current CMK, to apply forced ban – not sure, banning someone 
from the scene )	  
202 Eryılmaz (2006), p. 128.	  
203  Aksiyon, ¨Özel Güvenlik Krizde¨ http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-12873-34-ozel-
guvenlik-krizde.html	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bicycle. They were told that they could not enter the festival area and 
were harrassed by private security personnel.204 
Students of Osmangazi University in Eskişehir wanted to protest meal 
prices and were stopped by the private security personnel. Five students 
were handcuffed and brought to congress building and then handed over 
to the police.205 
 
Soner Akkurt had met his girlfriend the previous evening in the garden of 
Cerrahpaşa Medical Faculty Hospital. He was badly beaten and 
hospitalized. Akkurt stated that he was severely beaten when he 
confronted security personnel who were indecently harassing his 
girlfriend.206 
In an incident that took place in the Taksim Metro station, 20-year- old 
Aykut Kelek was injured when security personnel hit him in the head 
with their metal detector. He received emergency treatment in the Taksim 
Metro station before being taken to the hospital in serious condition.207 
 
As the private security sector grows and recruits more personnel, the occurrence of 
personnel exceeding their authority and the use of unreasonable force increases. In 
this manner, with the enactment of Law 5188, such as within universities overseen 
by private security guards, students are prevented from organizing the most common 
social activities including such things as meetings.  
 
5.2.5. The Private Security Sector And Its Relationship With The Public Force 
While not a part of the state, private security is mostly thought of as a sector that is 
controlled by the state. It is expected to aid the public force’s struggles and does so 
covering areas the state cannot afford to service. Studies by Mustafa Gülcü, a high-
ranking member of the Turkish National Police Force, on the philosophy of private 
security is an important reference point that examines the understanding of the 
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  Milliyet, ¨Ramazan Şenliğinde Özel Güvenlik Terörü,¨ September 23, 2008.	  
205 Radikal, ¨ Osmangazi Üniversitesi’nde Protestocu Öğrencilere Özel Güvenlikten Müdahale, ¨ 
March 11, 2013.	  
206 Hürriyet, ¨ Özel Güvenlik Terörü, ¨ November 30, 2012.	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  Radikal, ¨ Yine Özel Güvenlik, Yine Ölçüsüz Şiddet, ¨ December 30, 2013.	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sector in Turkey. In Özel Güvenliğin Felsefesi,208 Gülcü promotes this neoliberal 
project in pure and perfect order. Gülcü describes the privatization of security as an 
element of democracy that draws its intellectual power from the political and 
economic power of neoliberalism. This means that it breaks state supervision, 
enhances personal and social satisfaction to the detriment of absolute state authority, 
and makes citizens active consumers of the public service. He believes, in this way, 
that the quality of security services then improves and citizens feel safer. In fact, he 
sees private security not as an end, but a fresh start leading to private investigation 
services private forensic services, private experts, private criminal laboratories, a 
jury system for criminal cases, and private prisons. 
One sees how the supporters of this neoliberal project, whose need for security could 
not be supplied without the use of private security services, embody the dominant 
way of thinking of private security. They demand extra security packages. 
Moreover, they become proponents of incentives and sedition for private security. 
Security anxiety no longer is visible in all strata of society. The propagation of 
insecurity simultaneously imposes the idea that there can be various security 
standards.209 
Also, I must draw attention to the fact that privatization of security has occurred in a 
manner different from Gülcü's theory. It is not easy to transfer or share duties and 
authority of the public force by private security organizations even if only partially. 
As I stated above, from the very beginning, Law 5188 is designed to create a sector 
occupying an ambiguous field which is stuck between the state and the private 
sector. Consequently, the privatization of security, even as it has been stated in the 
law, was never meant to be solely a competing sector which is free of the state’s 
interventions.210  
When examined under this scope, it is interesting to note that the managers of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208  Mustafa Gülcü, ¨Özel Güvenliğin Felsefesi,¨ Polis Dergisi, vol. 31-32, 
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209 Bora (2007), p. 60.	  
210 Yardımcı (2009), p. 329.	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private security companies and their training facilities mostly consist of retired 
members of the public force. These people’s entry and activity in the private security 
sector are facilitated by certain legal arrangements.211 It showed that the state 
intended to allow private companies to recruit people into the chain of command 
who had been trained by the state; thus making the private security sector much 
more controllable.212  
            
With the legalization of private security operations, many who retired from the 
state’s official institutions took their place in the sector as founders or managers and 
they were followed by people who had expectations of making money in this 
profitable business. These people applied for retirement and transferred over to the 
private sector. Brigadier General Veli Küçük,213 the former governor of Istanbul 
Erol Çakır,214 and the former undersecretary of the Intelligence Service Sönmez 
Köksal215 are just a few of these retired officers. To understand the meaning and the 
logic of the construct of private security, as well as the extent to which its activity is 
an integral part of the neoliberal state, which tends to dominate every space within 
the life of the society, one needs to recall the speech of the former director of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 This statement was added to the 3rd Clause of the 5th Article of Law 5188. It facilitated the 
transfer of people who are members of some public force and assigned them as a managers or rangers 
in private security companies. Decree: "Regular officers are not required to be graduates of a four-
year college."	  
212	  Atılgan (2009), p. 264.	  
213 Veli Küçük is a retired Brigadier General. He served in the Gendarmerie Regiment Headquarters 
of Edirne, Eskişehir, Van, Ağrı, Kocaeli and Hatay. He was promoted to general in 1996. As a 
general, he was stationed for two years as district commander of the Giresun Gendermarie District 
Command in Giresun on the Black Sea. While he was Brigadier General at Çanakkale Headquarters, 
he transfered the brigade to the city of Bilecik. In 2000, he retired in Bilecik as a Brigadier General.	  
214 Erol Çakır served as a Civil Service Inspector, a Secretary of the Supervisory Commission, as a 
member of Secretary General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Governorships of Rize-Bursa-
Muğla, the Central Governorship,  as the Under Secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He 
started his duties as governor on July 24th of 1997. Then he was assigned to the Governorship of 
İstanbul on August 6th of 1998. He was succeeded by Muammer Güler on February 16th of 2003.	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  At the Ministry of International Affairs Sönmez served in the following roles: He began as the 
Departmant Manager of the Office of International Economic Affairs, as the Consul General in 
Burgas, the Under Secretary at the Turkish Embassy in Paris, the Manager of the Middle East Offices 
and Research, the Assistant General Manager of the Office of International Economic Affairs, and the 
Consul General of Bagdat and Resident Representative of Turkey in the European Council. Lastly, he 
served as General Consul in Paris. Between November 9th of 1992 and February 11th of 1998, he 
served as the Director of the National Intelligence Agency.	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Narcotics Office of Istanbul Nihat Kubuş:216 
 
In 1999, the governorship of Istanbul started to search for a mechanism 
that would control and provide surveillance within every aspect the 
everyday life after the incident of the Blue Bazaar Fire.217 
 
The enlightening interviews218 conducted by Yardımcı and Alemdar with people 
related to the security sector show the sector causes considerable problems in its 
own right. First, the adaptation of retired public officers to the security sector does 
not go without the transfer of their privileged status to the private companies where 
institutional management is different. It matters that companies are responsible for 
providing equal opportunities to everyone, but they should not contain a strict 
hierarchical mechanism, and should not promote the retired officers’ authoritarian 
demeanor toward their civilian co-workers. However, the owners of companies find 
it difficult to avoid this.219 
Despite all of this, private security companies are not blameless in their allowing 
retired officers’ access to ways that enable companies to bypass certain 
procedures.220 The companies profit from the retired and former officers’ access to 
governmental networks and enjoy the benefits of having "a friend in court". This is 
important to the owners or board members of private companies. Using the retired 
officers and their close relationships to public forces, they can easily use these 
networks to prevent possible audits. This demonstrates how, eventually, the 
hierarchical structure runs in favor of the sector. 
We can link the transfer of personnel from public to private institutions to the 
establishment of an ambiguous division of work among these institutions, and this 	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  Tan Morgül and Volkan Aytar (2007) ¨Türkiye’nin Özel Güvenliği: interview with Nihat Kubuş,¨ 
İstanbul Dergisi Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, vol.59, p. 90.	  
217 The fire in Mavi Çarşı was an armed assault that occured on the 13th of  March of 1999 and 
caused the death of 13 citizens.	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220 Yardımcı and Alemdar (2010), p. 43.	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runs parallel to the confusion in the mindset of a government that was inspired by 
neoliberalism. To sum up, everything points to the idea that the relationship or 
cooperation between the security sector and the police force prevents a healthy audit 
mechanism. In Turkey, the state has penetrated private security activities and it may 
easily disable the audit and judicial mechanism as well. 
Lastly, while discussing the presence of the state in the private security sector, we 
should consider that as murky as the difference between public institutions and the 
private sector is, this is also true between civilian and state offices. To understand 
the complex and versatile structure of private security in Turkey, its operations must 
be considered part of the state’s strategy to rule, which exceeds every traditional and 
political category that comes to mind. 
 
5.2.6. Problems Of Private Security Sector 
The increase in the numbers of private security companies and training facilities 
brought several problems in practice. Due to some private security companies basing 
their motivations on stealing market share rather than keeping their service quality 
high with well-trained personnel, delivery of ethical security services have become 
harder. In this manner, clients requiring private security services by making their 
choices in favor of these companies are preventing the service of private security to 
be performed at a certain quality.221  
As seen on the regulation about the private security sector, considering the sector’s 
commercial worries, lawmakers are stretching legal regulations. It is obvious that the 
Turkish state is trying to strike a balance its control over the security sector and the 
sector’s economic interests. However, problems in the regulation and the education 
of the personnel in private security are causing a lot of exploits in practice. 
Article number 3 of Law 5188 regulates what kind of arms and equipment private 
security personnel may bear when in service. Yet, this regulation neither clarifies 
what the physical protection precautions are nor indicates necessities or guidelines 
for use. Likewise, it is uncertain that who will provide these arms and equipment. 	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Because of this reason, private security companies and their training facilities 
exploit the uncertainty. 
Namely, Law 5188 states that the weapons and equipment of the private security 
personnel that will be used during the security service are to be provided by the 
hiring person or company. Consequently, according to the law, private security 
companies cannot have or purchase firearms. But there is an exception to this. 
According to Article number 8, with the approval of the governor and the 
commission decision, private security training facilities may be given authorization 
to purchase, carry and use firearms to be used in firearms training, escorting transfer 
of money or valuables and to give temporary armed protection or security services. 
The Law created a problem in a very large area alongside another problem it did not 
predict or regulate. Giant capital institutions can establish such a private security 
company to serve within themselves to provide security to their companies which 
turn such capital institution into a self-sufficient armed force.222  
Because of the exploitation, capital institutions become a monopoly by buying 
private security companies, turning them into a self-financing alternative armed 
force within the state. This shows us that transferring security services to free 
market, in contrary to the claims, is far from giving the transparency promised by 
de-militarization.223 As stated before, most of the actors in private security sector are 
veterans of army or police force. These problematic compromises are being 
exploited by these people to run counter-guerilla operations, forming militias, mafias 
and attempting other illegal activities:224 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Haspolat (2012), p. 230. 
223 Yardımcı (2009), p. 245.	  
224 In the investigations made under the scope of the operation known as Ergenekon, some 
confidential information was released to the media. According to Istanbul Chamber of Commerce 
company records, the ex-mayor of Istanbul, Erol Çakır, retired Brigadier General Veli Küçük, and 
Nihat Kubuş, who was also Çakır’s clerk for some time, founded a private security company called 
Stratejik Güvenlik Koruma ve Eğitm Anonim Şirketi (Strategic Security and Training Joint-Stock 
Company) on November 29, 2004. Here I must touch on Kubuş’s promotion during Çakır's years as 
mayor and his assignment as the Narcotic Unit Manager. Following the end of Çakır's time in office, 
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Küçük's name was also mentioned as a suspect in the Hrant Dink murder case. The allegations 
effectively ended the partnership. (Milliyet, "Tuhaf Bir İş Ortaklığı," August 8, 2008) Also commonly 
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It is revealed that Nurullah İlgün, who attempted to assassinate Erdoğan 
Teziç, the Director of YÖK, was working as a private security personnel 
in Istanbul for five years. As Private Security Law dictates, high school 
graduate Nurullah İlgün had gone through security investigations and 
acquired a private security license from the Police Department.225   
In this context, privatization of security carries the risks of creating commercial 
entities which have the authority to use deadly force in order to protect their interests 
and territories. I should note that exploitations of private security operations are not 
casual troubles and this sector, being mentioned within such illegal activities, needs 
to be strictly inspected. But the law oversees the hierarchical relations and 
cooperation between the private security sector and the public force and it makes 
healthy investigations difficult. As seen in similar exploitation cases which official 
apparatuses of the state have involved and court authorities have claimed to 
preservation of "state’s interests", investigations and judgment mechanisms can 
easily become dysfunctional. 
5.2.7. Private Security Companies And The Rise Of State Surveillance 
The private security companies, which were founded with Law 5188, are perceived 
to be a control mechanism of the majority of the population because of their 
surveillance and operations overseeing and infiltrating every area of daily life. 
Private security companies help the state to have vast control of society through their 
services and operations. 
First, the proliferation of private security is an aspect of a surveillance society, and 
this is what is known as a police state.226 The private security guards wearing special 
uniforms are under the control of the police force by law, but they have the authority 
to use force in certain areas to relieve security anxieties/interests. These guards are 
given almost as much authority as the police force because of the problems arising 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
known as "Sauna Çetesi" (Sauna Gang), they were operating from February of 2006. There was 
mention of a private security company owner along with some high-ranking government officials that 
were being targeted because of some illegal connections he had. This person had been taken into 
custody because he had been deemed to have "established a profit-making criminal organization to 
operate within his organization." (Sabah, "Sauna Çetesi'ne Asker El Koydu", February 22, 2006) 
225 Hürriyet, ¨Suikastçi Özel Güvenlikçi Çıktı,¨ April 26, 2007. 
226 Can Kozanoğlu (2001) ¨Polis Toplumu, Özel Güvenlik, Bodyguard,¨ in Kozanoğlu Yeni Şehir 
Notları, Iletişim Press: Istanbul, pp. 137-176. 
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from the law mentioned above. They can act as symbols of state authority in 
practice. 227 This goes as far as being tasked, if required, with maintaining order 
alongside the police force.228 Taking the view that is in opposition to the dominant 
way of thinking, this proliferation shows that a police state has emerged, which is 
supported by enlarging the modes/scope of surveillance and supervision. 
Second, the privatization of security functions as a bio-administration that allows for 
the extension of the state’s surveillance. This privatization enables a group of private 
guards to collect information and to intervene in situations in their place of work. 
Nonetheless, this is not the whole story. First, as I mentioned before, the authority of 
these private guards is valid only at their stations, and they are also expected to be 
law-abiding employees. It is a fact that they can appear in any and every moment of 
daily life. In other words, even if the law limits the authority of a guard, their 
appearance is continuous in the practice and this transforms people’s use of public 
space.229  
In addition, the professionalization of security precautions is the result of 
technological surveillance that has launched extensive changes in security 
equipment. Closed-circuit camera systems and turnstiles make surveillance 
technology available at every turn. It becomes an employer’s routine monitoring of 
an employee, or a parent of his/her child, or a school principal of their students.230 In 
brief, these precautionary security practices are a change away from the focus on 
actual crimes to increasing the ability of collecting evidence, which enables the 
continuation of security anxiety throughout social life. 231  Some examples of 
surveillance technologies are as follows:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Atılgan (2009), p. 263. 
228 In Şırnak, Mehmet Avcı, the Chief of Police, talks about how private security guards help the 
police force: ¨Private security supports us. It means that we no longer need to assign squads to the 
places where private guards work. It also increase our mobility. Thanks to private security, we can 
increase our control points.¨ (www.medya73.com, 2009 July)   
229 Yardımcı (2009), p. 250. 
230 Haspolat (2012), p. 254. 
231 Tanıl Bora (2011) ¨Polis ve ‘Cemaat’,¨ Birikim, vol. 264-265, pp. 3-9. 
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A new type of security control system has been released. A private 
company, named Perkotek with a large number of customers in Turkey, 
has begun to sell a ‘toilet-tracking system.’ This system promises 
customers that they will uncover employees that spend too much time in 
toilet, by installing card or fingerprint reader terminals on the doors. 232 
 
In Adana province, the robbery of a jewelry store by three young girls 
was caught on security cameras. It drew attention to the fact that one girl 
with stolen jewelry was walking behind the other two girls, who were 
trying to hide her. 233 
 
Fatih Koç, the department chief of Crime Scene Investigation and 
Identification, said that there are 17.5 million persons on record in the 
department’s fingerprint system. The persons recorded in the database 
consist of those who apply for driver licenses, passports, and licenses to 
bear arms; and include private security guards or police officers. Also, 
included are those who have court cases. 234 
 
The Turkish Football Federation e-ticket system has been designed in a 
way to record private information of all football fans. If one wants to go a 
football match, s/he buys a card called Passolig to enter the stadium. To 
obtain this card s/he also has to provide a photo, national ID number, and 
a residence document. 235 
 
Medical service scams would be a thing of past. The Social Security 
Institution Biometric Identification Project came into effect on September 
1, 2013. Citizens are able to authenticate their identities by fingerprint 
analysis. 236   
         
As seen in the examples, the proliferation of technological security has enabled the 
authorities to keep every space of daily life under surveillance and to supervise 
everyone’s behavior. Neoliberalism is an idea that allows seeing capital 
accumulation as public service. In short, there is a change in a country’s make up 
with the release of what can be seen as the public domain into the marketplace. 
Thus, the re-construction of public places is accompanied by the construction of 
monstrous buildings that severely strain infrastructure services and create ‘yawning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 Hürriyet, ¨Şimdi de tuvalet takip sistemi,¨ March 17, 2009. 
233 Radikal, ¨Kuyumcu soyan üç kız kardeş yakalandı,¨ August 27, 2008. 
234 Hürriyet, ¨17,5 milyon kişi parmaklarından tanınıyor,¨ January 13, 2014. 
235 Ezgi Başaran, ¨Yeni gözetleme, pardon, biletleme sistemi,¨ Radikal, September 26, 2013. 
236 Sabah, ¨Biyometrik Projesi 1 Eylül’de Başlıyor,¨ June 29, 2013. 
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gaps’ within the space those buildings occupy. These gigantic constructions, with 
shopping centers and office towers produce ‘insecurity’ and call for security services 
to oversee these occupied areas. In other words, the commodification provokes 
insecurity, and then develops a security circle against it.237 
Third, private security works with the public force and it helps the public force 
function to help "constitute public order". In this manner, the police force withdraws 
from secondary security fields (private, public, or semi-public places; such as 
stadiums, hospitals, schools, etc.) and security is transferred to private security 
organizations.238 The police force concentrates on ¨primary problems¨ that threaten 
the society.239 In this way, the state creates public opinion that private security not 
only guards the rich, but the entire society, and it hides the results of the 
privatization process that in fact punishes the poor. 240  While private security 
companies focus on the "crimes against the public order", the police and the army 
develop and reconstitute the state’s authority while referencing the greater 
"problems" that threaten the system.241 
To understand the immediate and total control that the state order elicits, it is also 
necessary to consider Article number 23 of Law 5335242, which eases the transfer of 
retired public officers into the private security sector that helps to create an 
ambiguous private security field. According to Article number 23, one can see that 
the "dilemma between framing security as a commodity freely bought and sold in 
the market, and keeping the state as the ultimate authority to which the security 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Kerem Kabadayı (2007) ¨Kent Dokusunun Arz Ettiği Tehdit: Azman Yapılar, Tekinsiz Boşluklar,¨ 
İstanbul Dergisi Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, vol. 59, p. 72. 
238 By saying of the legal forces: ¨While we strive against kidnapping and the bombers; let private 
security protect stadiums, airports, and brothels. ¨ Gülden Aydın, ¨ Özel Güvenlikçi Sayısı Polisi 
Geçti Askerlik Şubelerini Bile Onlar Koruyacak, ¨ Hürriyet, May 21, 2006. 
239 ¨We see that airports, museums, tourist areas can provide security by employing private security 
companies. Thus, the public force can focus more on public security.¨ Ahmet Karagöz, December 1, 
2001. (www.caginpolisi.com.tr) 
240 Haspolat (2012), pp. 249-250. 
241 Bedirhanoğlu (2010), p. 60.  
242 Law 5335 on Decisions to Change of Some Codes and Executive Orders, published in the Official 
Gazette no. 25798, dated 27 April 2005. 
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sector has to report" has occurred.243 Thereby, it is unclear whether private security 
companies are part of the police force or not. 
To sum up, for all intents and purposes, private security acts as a component of the 
police force and helps complete the police force’s mission to "secure public order". 
Accordingly, the police direct private security guards during the process of 
processing crimes and criminals, and concordantly, they set examples of how the 
security sector should be governed. This portrait of private security as a component 
of the "Neoliberal Leviathan" helps us grasp the idea that security is an instrument of 
surveillance and oppression in Turkey, and describes to what extent the public force 
extends its dominance. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Yardımcı and Alemdar (2010), p. 40.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, the revamping of the state’s dominance during the neoliberal era is 
discussed within the theoretical parameters of Loïc Wacquant’s exposition of 
neoliberalism. According to Wacquant, neoliberalism as a political constellation is a 
project that refers to the restructuring of the state using stratification and 
classification as a machine driving the neoliberal revolution from above. Wacquant 
suggests that neoliberalism brings not the shrinking of the government, but the 
building of a centaur state.  
This neoliberalization process is literally the institutionalization of a dominant state. 
It is during the AKP period that all of traits of what Wacquant calls a "Neoliberal 
Leviathan" are demonstrated. Accordingly, this period corresponds to an increased 
expansion of the state’s visibility and dominance. 
This study argues that characterization of the 1990s as a securitization period and the 
2000s as the transition to a liberal democracy as a two-pronged idea is incorrect. 
More specifically, the AKP period, rather than aiming to remove the "overly secure" 
foundation of the political system created by the September 12 military coup, 
adopted the idea of redesigning the political system it inherited and moreover, 
fortified the state’s need for security (both as a concept and as a practice).  
Compared to the previous period, neoliberalism during the AKP period was 
institutionalized and the commodification of the security industry was accelerated. 
This period can be characterized by the feeling of uncertainty in the populace 
exacerbated by the perception of a threat to the state and the evolution of the 
"responsible citizen" which gave birth to a new kind of socialization. Under this 
framework, the expansion of the security forces (both private and public) and the 
acceleration of the privatization of the security industry in Turkey during the AKP 
era as a whole did not mean there was a specific and effective response to crime 
itself or the overall feeling of insecurity. This also did not imply the maintenance of 
a small government. In fact, these are some of the components of the "Neoliberal 
Leviathan" that had come into being in Turkey. 
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Accordingly, the transition to neoliberalism in Turkey correlates closely with the 
idea that neoliberalism facilitates conditions for profitable capital accumulation, and 
becomes the primary mission of the state. It invites the shrinkage of the social wing 
of the state under the banner of fiscal prudence, and increases anxiety around the 
idea of security in every aspect of a citizen’s life within society.  
The ‘aura’ of security shapes the perception that there are threats. This creates a 
need for more security and calls for a private security sector, which works side by 
side with the public force. The orthodox discourse claims that privatization of 
security ends up with a separation of security practices from those of official 
entities. Parallel to this, this discourse redefines the private and the official under the 
scope of security. However, in practice, the privatization of security services only 
creates new channels for the government to control every part of daily life as the 
sector is commodified. 
Therefore, in Turkey, one should treat the growth and development of the private 
sector not as the harbinger of a small government, but the resurgence of the state 
authority over all security issues. This inclusive argument unfolds with the 
emergence of private security as a key figure dealing with cases of public order 
within daily life and the increasing attention on the state’s concentration on terror 
and anti-state movements. 
This role which was given to outside agents as a means of providing security, is not 
only a part of neoliberalism itself, but also, an inherent part of the information-based 
governance mechanism. It reorganizes authoritarian relationships within the society 
by enabling the control of individuals by the Turkish state. Consequently, it becomes 
the state process of consolidating itself through its new agents; which is a 
fundamental transformation of the neoliberal state’s definition of a traditional state. 
Thus the commodification of security should be evaluated as a process whereby the 
state reestablishes its own security. 
Similarly, the expansion of private security causes an increase in the number of arms 
within the society. It also calls for the re-organization of public space, and 
militarization of daily life by constructing new methods of surveillance. This all, in 
turn, results in the making of a state hegemony which would more completely 
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envelope society. In conclusion, the division of labor between public and private 
security forces enabled the sector to expand its dominance. This shows us how the 
privatization of the security industry transforms our daily life and contributes to the 
building of the "Neoliberal Leviathan." 
I want to finish this with a Cizre quotation, which I believe guides us for a better 
understanding of civilization and democracy in Turkey:   
[...] Main reform is about the change in the ideas and conceptions of non-
technical fields. Because, actually the alluded reality is: to rehabilitee the 
institutions that are responsible to establish security, about the definition 
of security concept and in the social philosophy in parallel by abstracting 
them about the lifestyles, democratic preferences and changes accruing in 
material world and new trends coming up, is an effort in vain. All it's 
going to be, this effort is, only physical modernism. Essential thing is, to 
be able to battle at two frontlines at the same time, while working on the 
institutions to establish a more effective and active security, on the other 
hand all these actions has to be fitted in a more democratic and peaceful 
frame as a wider and blanketing mental project. Consequently, in the hot 
conflict zone we live in, it's not to reinforce this country’s security policy 
spectrum no matter what, but to unite it on modern democratic priorities 
very strongly. Because, at this point, this is what ¨security¨ means.244 
 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Ümit Cizre (2006) ¨Giriş ya da ‘İtaat’ Kültürü Yerine Bilimsel İtiraf ya da İtiraz,¨ in Ümit Cizre 
(ed.) Almanak Türkiye 2005 Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim, Tesev Publishing: Istanbul, p. 
9.	  
 81 
	  	  
REFERENCES 
 
Published Resources 
 
Abrahamsen, R. and Michael C. W. (2007). ¨Securing the City: Private            
Security Companies and Non-State Authority in Global Governance.¨ 
International Relations, vol. 21 (2), pp. 237-253. 
Akay, H. (2009). Türkiye’de Güvenlik Sektörü: Sorular, Sorunlar, Çözümler. Tesev 
Publishing: Istanbul. 
Alkan, M. Ö. (2006). ¨Türkiye’de Seçim Sistemi Tercihinin Misyon Boyutu ve 
Demokratik Gelişime Etkileri.¨ Anayasa Yargısı, vol. 23, pp. 133-165. 
Amoore, L. (2009). ¨Algorithmic War.¨ Antipode, vol. 41 (1), pp. 49-69. 
Atılgan, M. (2009). ¨Özel Güvenlik.¨ In Bayramoğlu and Insel (eds.) Almanak 
Türkiye 2006-2008 – Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim. Tesev 
Publishing: Istanbul, pp. 260-268. 
Aydın, G. (2006). ¨ Özel Güvenlikçi Sayısı Polisi Geçti Askerlik Şubelerini Bile 
Onlar Koruyacak.¨ Hürriyet. 
Balta Paker, E. (2009). ¨Güvenlik Endüstrisi ve Güven(siz)liğin İnşası: Bir 
Toplumsal Paranoyayı Anlamak.¨ Toplum ve Bilim, vol. 115, pp. 204-225. 
Balta Paker, E. (2010). ¨Dış Tehditten İç Tehdide: Türkiye’de Doksanlarda Ulusal 
Güvenliğin Yeniden İnşası.¨ In Balta Paker and Akça (eds.) Türkiye’de Ordu, 
Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti. Istanbul Bilgi University Press: Istanbul, pp. 407-
432. 
Balta, E. (2014). ¨Bildiğimiz Anlamda Devletin Sonu Mu? İmparatorluk ve Özel 
Ordular.¨ Birikim, vol. 178, pp. 11-19. 
Başaran, E. (2013). ¨Yeni gözetleme, pardon, biletleme sistemi.¨ Radikal, September 
26, 2013. 
Bayramoğlu, A. (2009). ¨Asker ve Siyaset.¨ In Insel and Bayramoğlu (eds.) Bir 
Zümre Bir Parti Türkiye’de Ordu, 4th ed. Birikim Press: Istanbul, pp. 59-119. 
Bayramoğlu, S. (2010). Yönetişim Zihniyeti – Türkiye’de Üst Kurullar ve Siyasal 
İktidarın Dönüşümü. Iletişim Press: Istanbul. 
Bedirhanoğlu, P. (2010). ¨Türkiye’de Neoliberal Otoriter Devletin AKP’li Yüzü.¨ In 
Uzgel and Duru (eds.) AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu. 2nd ed. 
Phoenix Press: Ankara, pp. 40-65. 
 82 
Bekmen, A. (2013). ¨State and Capital in Turkey During the Neoliberal Era.¨ In 
Akça, Bekmen and Özden (eds.) Turkey Reframed:Constituting Neoliberal 
Hegemony. Pluto Press: London. 
Berksoy, B. (2007). ¨Neoliberalizm ve Toplumsalın Yeniden Kurgulanması: 1980 
Sonrası Batı’da ve Türkiye’de Polis Teşkilatları ve Geçirdikleri Yapısal 
Dönüşüm.¨ Toplum ve Bilim, vol. 109, pp. 35-65. 
Berksoy, B. (2009). ¨Devlet Stratejilerinin Bir Tezahürü Olarak Polis Alt-Kültürü: 
1960 Sonrası Türkiye’de Polis Teşkilatında Hakim Olan Söylemlere Dair Bir 
Değerlendirme.¨ Toplum ve Bilim, vol. 114, pp. 98-130. 
Berksoy, B. (2009). ¨Polis Teşkilatı.¨ In Bayramoğlu and Insel (eds.) Almanak 
Türkiye 2006-2008 – Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim. Tesev 
Publishing: Istanbul, pp. 230-242. 
Bora, T. (2007). ¨Güvenlik Alanının Özelleşmesi: Gariba ‘Emniyet’, Kibar 
Muhitlere ‘Özel Güvenlik’ Mi?¨ İstanbul Dergisi Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 
vol.59, pp. 58-61. 
Bora, T. (2004). ¨Özel Güvenlik ve ‘Polis Toplumu’.¨ Birikim, vol. 178, pp. 20-23. 
Bora, T. (2011). ¨Polis ve ‘Cemaat’.¨ Birikim, vol. 264-265, pp. 3-9. 
Boratav, K. (2002). Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-2002. Imge Kitabevi Publisher: 
Ankara. 
Bourdieu, P. (1994). ¨Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the 
Bureaucratic Feild. ¨ Sociological Theory. Trans. Loïc Wacquant and Samar 
Farage, vol. 12 (1), pp. 1-18. 
Brenner, N. and N. Theodore. (2002). ¨Cities and Geographies of Neoliberalism: 
Theoretical Debates.¨ In Brenner and Theodore (eds.) Spaces of Neoliberalism. 
Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, pp. 2-32. 
Brenner, N., J. Peck and N. Theodore. (2010) ¨Variegated Neoliberalization: 
Geographies, Modalities, Pathways.¨ Global Networks, vol. 10 (2),  pp. 182-
222. 
Çavlin Bozbeyoğlu, A. (2011). ¨Nüfusun Biyopolitikasına Yeni Açılım: Türkiye’nin 
Biyometrik Ekektronik Kimlik Kartı Sistemi.¨ Toplum ve Bilim, vol. 122, pp. 
53-74. 
Cizre, Ü. (1997). ¨The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy.¨ 
Comperative Politics, vol. 29(2), pp. 151-166.  
Cizre, Ü. (2006). ¨Giriş ya da ‘İtaat’ Kültürü Yerine Bilimsel İtiraf ya da İtiraz.¨ In 
Ümit Cizre (ed.) Almanak Türkiye 2005 Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik 
Gözetim. Tesev Publishing: Istanbul, pp. 8-11. 
Cizre, Ü. (2008). Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey. Routledge Press: New 
York. 
 83 
Coaffe, J. (2007). ¨Londra’da ‘Terrörizm’ ve Risk.¨ İstanbul Dergisi Tarih Vakfı 
Yayınları, vol. 59, pp. 74-77. 
Dardot, P. and C. Laval. (2012). Dünyanın Yeni Aklı: Neoliberal Toplum Üzerine 
Deneme. Trans. Işık Ergüden. Istanbul Bilgi University Press: Istanbul. 
De Geode, M. (2008). ¨The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe. 
¨ European Journal of International Relations, vol: 14 (1), pp. 161-185. 
England, K. and K. Ward (2007). ¨Preface.¨ In England and Ward (eds.) 
Neoliberalization: States, Networks, Peoples. Blackwell Publishing: Oxford.  
England, K. and K. Ward. (2007). ¨Introduction: Reading Neoliberalization.¨ In 
England and Ward (eds.) Neoliberalization: States, Networks, Peoples. 
Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, pp. 1-22.  
Erdal, M. (2009). ¨Anayasalarda Milli Güvenlik.¨ In Bayramoğlu and Insel (eds.) 
Almanak Türkiye 2006-2008 – Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim. 
Tesev Publishing: Istanbul, pp. 34-42. 
Eryılmaz, M. B. (2006). ¨Özel Güvenlik.¨ In Ümit Cizre (ed.) Almanak Türkiye 2005 
Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim. Tesev Publishing: Istanbul, pp. 124-
133. 
Esen, O. (2007). ¨Sonu Belli Bir Hikayeye Yatırım Yapmak.¨ İstanbul Dergisi Tarih 
Vakfı Yayınları, vol. 59, pp. 106-129. 
Ferguson, J. (2009). ¨The Use of Neoliberalism.¨ Antipode, vol. 41(1), pp. 166-184. 
Foucault, M. (1991). ¨Governmentality.¨ In Burchell, Gordon and Miller (eds.) The 
Foucault Effect. The University of Chicago Press: USA, pp. 87-104. 
Gambetti, Z. (2007). ¨Linç Girişimleri, Neo-liberalizm ve Güvenlik Devleti.¨ 
Toplum ve Bilim, vol. 109, pp. 7-34. 
Gordon, C. (1991). ¨Governmental Rationality: An Introduction.¨ In Burchell, 
Gordon and Miller (eds.) The Foucault Effect. The University of Chicago 
Press: USA, pp. 1-52. 
Gözübüyük, Ş. (1997). Yönetim Hukuku, Turhan Press: Ankara. 
Gülen, F. (2010). ¨AKP’nin İktidarda Olduğu Dönemde Yasama Faaliyetleri (2002-
2007).¨ In Uzgel and Duru (eds.) AKP Kitabı – Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu. 2nd 
ed. Phoenix Press: Ankara, pp. 195-224. 
Hannah, M. G. (2009). ¨Calculable Territory and the West German Cencus Boycott 
Movements of the 1980s.¨ Political Geography, vol. 28, pp. 66-75. 
Harvey, D. (2006). ¨Neo-liberalism and the Restoration of Class Power.¨ Spaces of 
Global Capitalism: A Theory of Uneven Geographical Development. Verso: 
New York. 
 84 
Harvey, D. (2007). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
Haspolat, E. (2006). ¨Devlet-Güvenlik İlişkisinin Değişen İçeriği: Dünyada ve 
Türkiye’de Özel Güvenlik.¨ Eğitim Bilim Toplum Dergisi, vol. 4(13), pp. 60-
79. 
Haspolat, E. (2012). Neoliberalizm ve Baskı Aygıtının Dönüşümü. Notabene Press: 
Ankara. 
Huysmans, J. (1998). ¨Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick 
Signifier.¨ European Journal of International Relations, vol. 4(2), p. 226-255. 
Jessop, B. (1991). ¨On the Originality, Legacy, and Actuality of Nicos Poulantzas.¨ 
Studies in Political Economy, vol. 34, pp. 75-107. 
Kabadayı, K. (2007). ¨Kent Dokusunun Arz Ettiği Tehdit: Azman Yapılar, Tekinsiz 
Boşluklar.¨ İstanbul Dergisi Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, vol. 59, pp. 70-73. 
Kingfisher, C. and J. Maskovsky. (2008). ¨Introduction: The Limits of 
Neoliberalism.¨ Critique of Anthropology, vol. 28, pp. 115-126. 
Kozanoğlu, C. (2001). ¨Polis Toplumu, Özel Güvenlik, Bodyguard.¨ In Kozanoğlu 
(ed.) Yeni Şehir Notları. Iletişim Press: Istanbul, pp. 137-176. 
Larner, W. (2000). ¨Neo-liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality.¨ Studies in 
Political Economy, vol. 63, pp. 5-25. 
Leander, A. (2005). ¨The Market Force and Public Security.¨ Journal of Peace 
Research, vol. 42 (5), pp. 605-622. 
Loader, I. (1997). ¨Private Security and the Demand for Protection in Contemporary 
Britain.¨ Policing and Society, vol. 7, pp. 143-162. 
Morgül, T. and V. Aytar. (2007). ¨Türkiye’nin Özel Güvenliği: Interview with Nihat 
Kubuş.¨ İstanbul Dergisi Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, vol. 59, pp. 90-91. 
Mueller, J. (2004). ¨Why Isn’t There More Violence?¨ Security Studies, vol. 13(3), 
pp. 191-203. 
Mutlugün, M. and O. Adalıer. (2009). ¨Turkish National Electronic Identity Card.¨ 
Proceeding of the 2nd International Conference on Security on Information 
and Networks October 6-10, 2009, North Cyprus. 
Neocleous, M. (2008). ¨Security, Commodity, Fetishism.¨ Critique: Journal of 
Socialist Theory, vol. 35 (3), pp. 339-355. 
Ong, A. (2007). ¨Neoliberalism As A Mobile Technology.¨ Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers, vol. 32 (1), pp. 3-8. 
Öniş, Z. and F. Şenses. (2005). ¨Rethinking of the Emerging Post-Washington 
Consensus.¨ Development and Change, vol. 36(2), pp. 263-290. 
 85 
Öniş, Z. and F. Şenses. (2007). ¨Global Dynamics, Domestic Coalitions and A 
Reactive State: Major Policy Shifts in Post-war Turkish Economic 
Development.¨ METU Studies in Development, vol. 34, pp. 251-286. 
Özbay, F. (2010). ¨Türkiye’de Ulus-devlet, Gözetim ve Nüfus Bilgisi.¨ Toplum ve 
Bilim, vol. 118, pp. 165-178. 
Özcan, G. (1998). ¨Doksanlı Yıllarda Türkiye’nin Değişen Güvenlik Ortamı.¨ In 
Özcan and Kut (eds.) En Uzun Onyıl – Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış 
Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar. Boyut Press: Istanbul, pp. 13-34. 
Özcan, G. (2006). ¨Türkiye’de Siyasal Rejim ve Güvenlikleştirme Sorunsalı.¨ In 
Ülman and Akça (eds.) İktisat, Siyaset, Devlet Üzerine Yazılar: Prof. Dr. 
Kemâli Saybaşılı’ya Armağan. Bağlam Press: Istanbul, pp. 355-378. 
Özcan, G. (2010). ¨Türkiye’de Milli Güvenlik Kavramının Gelişimi.¨ In Balta Paker 
and Akça (eds.) Türkiye’de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti. Istanbul Bilgi 
University Press: Istanbul, pp. 307-350. 
Peck, J. and A. Tickell. (2002). ¨Neoliberalization Space.¨ Antipode, vol. 34(3), pp. 
380-404. 
Sancar, M. (2008). ¨Devlet Aklı¨ Kıskacında Hukuk Devleti. 4th ed. Iletişim Press: 
Istanbul.  
Schreier, F. and M. Caparini. (2005). ¨Privatizing Security: Law, Practice and 
Governance of Private Military and Security Companies.¨ Occasional Paper 
for Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, no. 6. 
Singer, P. W. (2003). Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military 
Industry. Cornell University Press: USA. 
Sönmez, Ü. (2011). Piyasanın İdaresi. Iletişim Press: Istanbul. 
Springer, S. (2012). ¨Neoliberalism as Discourse: Between Foucauldian Political 
Economy and Marxian Poststructuralism.¨ Critical Discourse Studies, vol. 
9(2), pp. 133-147. 
Steenkamp, C. (2005). ¨The Legacy of War: Conceptualizing A ‘Culture of 
Violence’ to Explain Violence after Peace Accords.¨ The Round Table, vol. 
94, pp. 253-267. 
Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Küreselleşme, Büyük Hayal Kırıklığı. Taşçıoğlu and Vural 
(trans.). Plan B Press: Istanbul. 
Tanör, B. (2014). Osmanlı Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri. Yapı Kredi Publishing: 
Istanbul. 
Taşkın, Y. (2006). ¨Türkiye Sağı’nı Anlamak: Soğuk Savaş ve Sonrası İçin Bir İzah 
Denemesi.¨ In Ülman and Akça (eds.) İktisat, Siyaset, Devlet Üzerine Yazılar 
– Prof. Dr. Kemâli Saybaşılı’ya Armağan. Bağlam Press: Istanbul, pp. 337-
354. 
 86 
Tilly, C. (2003). ¨Armed Forces, Regimes, and Contention in Europe since 1650.¨ In 
Davis and Peredge (eds.) Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics 
and State Formation. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, New York. 
Tuğal, C. (2009). Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to 
Capitalism. Stanford University Press: Stanford. 
Tünay, M. (1993). ¨The Turkish New Right’s Attempt at Hegemony.¨ In Eralp, 
Tünay and Yeşilada (eds.) The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of 
Turkey. Praeger Publishing: Westwood, pp. 11-30. 
Ülman, B. (1998). ¨Türkiye’nin Yeni Güvenlik Algılamaları ve ‘Bölücülük’.¨ In 
Özcan and Kut (eds.) En Uzun Onyıl – Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış 
Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar. Boyut Press: Istanbul, pp. 101-129. 
Uzgel, İ. (2010). ¨AKP: Neoliberal Dönüşümün Yeni Aktörü.¨ In Uzgel and Duru 
(eds.) AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu. 2nd ed. Phoenix Press: Ankara, 
pp. 11-39. 
Wacquant, L. (1999). ¨How Penal Common Sense Comes to Europeans: Notes on 
the Transatlantic Diffusion of the Neoliberal Doxa.¨ European Societies, vol. 3 
(1), pp. 319-352.  
Wacquant, L. (2010). ¨Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare and 
Social Insecurity.¨ Sociological Forum, vol. 25 (2), pp. 197-220. 
Wacquant, L. (2012). ¨Three Steps to Historical Anthropology of Actually Existing 
Neoliberalism.¨ Social Anthropology, vol. 20, pp. 66-79. 
Yardımcı, S. and Z. Alemdar. (2010). ¨The Privatization of Security in Turkey: 
Reconsidering the State, the Concept of ‘Governmentality’¨and 
Neoliberalism.¨ New Perspectives on Turkey, vol. 43, pp. 33-61. 
Yardımcı, S. (2009). ¨Kuşatma Altında Gündelik Hayat: Özel Güvenlik, Kent 
Yaşamı ve Yönetimsellik.¨ Toplum ve Bilim, vol. 115, pp. 226-260. 
Yavuz, M. H. (2006). The Emergence of A New Turkey – Democracy and the AK 
Party. The University of Utah Press: Utah. 
Yazıcı, B. (2013). ¨Güncel Sosyal Bilim Analizinin Sihirli Anahtarı: 
‘Neoliberalizm’?¨ Toplum ve Bilim, vol. 128, pp. 7-31. 
Yıldırım, Y. (2003-4). ¨Batı Siyasal Aklının Analitiği: Yeni Bir Egemenlik Formuna 
Doğru.¨ Toplum ve Bilim, vol. 99, pp. 28-64. 
Yıldırım, D. (2010). ¨AKP ve Neoliberal Popülizm.¨ In Uzgel and Duru (eds.) AKP 
Kitabı – Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu. 2nd ed. Phoenix Press: Ankara, pp. 66-
107. 
Yonucu, D. and Z. Gönen. (2012). ¨Legitimizing Violence and Segregation: 
Neoliberal Discourses on Crime and the Criminalization of Urban Poor 
 87 
Populations in Turke.¨ In Bourke, Dafnos and Kip (eds.) Lumpencity: 
Discourses of Marginality, Marginalizing Discourses. Red Quill, pp. 75-103. 
 
Electronic Sources 
 
Ahmet Karagöz, December 1, 2001. (www.caginpolisi.com.tr) 
Aksiyon, ¨Özel Güvenlik Krizde¨ http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-12873-
34-ozel-guvenlik-krizde.html 
Bianet, ¨Vazife ve Salahiyetle Gelen Polis Şiddeti,¨ November 27, 2007, 
www.bianet.org. 
Filiz Zabcı,  p. 7, 
http://www.tasam.org/Files/PDF/Raporlar/yeni_savaslarin_gizli_yuzu_ozel_as
keri_sirketler_d3ad2e36-9fa4-4222-a919-a4d2177e86c3.pdf (website access: 
May 23, 2014). 
Frank Furedi (2007) ¨The Only Thing We Have to Fear is the ‘Culture of Fear’ 
Itself, ¨ http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/3053#.U39lKi-Nlo4. 
http://www.ozelguvenlik.pol.tr/Sayfalar/istatistikbilgiler.aspx. (website accessed on 
18 April 2014) 
Micheal Foucault (1971), ¨The Debate on Human Nature by Michel Foucault and 
Noam Chomsky,¨ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3wfNl2L0Gf8.  
Mustafa Gülcü, ¨Özel Güvenliğin Felsefesi,¨ Polis Dergisi, vol. 31-32, 
http://www.polisdergisi.pol.tr/Sayfalar/arsiv.aspx 
Şebnem Oğuz (2009) ¨The Response of the Turkish State to the 2008 Crisis: A 
Further Step Towards Neoliberal Authoritarian Statism,¨ Presentation at Third 
IIPPE International Research Workshop, 
http://www.iippe.org/wiki/images/a/ac/Oguz_IIPPE_Ankara.pdf (accessed 5 
September 2014), p. 7. 
Umur Talu, ¨Özel Güvenlik Kamusal Tehlike,¨ 
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/10/18/talu.html 
 
Cases Cited 
Law 2495 on Protecting and Securing Some Institutions, published in the Official 
Gazette no. 17410 dated 24 July 1981. 
Law 3201 concerning the Police Force, published in the Official Gazette no. 3629, 
dated 12 June 1937. 
Law 5188 on Private Security Services, published in the Official Gazette no. 25504 
dated 26 June 2004. 
Law 5335 on Decisions to Change of Some Codes and Executive Orders, published 
in the Official Gazette no. 25798, dated 27 April 2005. 
 88 
Law 5429 on Statistics of Turkey, published in the Official Gazette no. 25997, dated 
10 November 2005.   
Law 5490 on Population Services, published in the Official Gazette no. 26153, dated 
25 April 2006.  
 
News Cited 
 
Agos. ¨Güven Gürkan Öztan Röportajı.¨ March 28, 2014. 
Cnntürk. ¨Star TV’nin Doğuş’a Satışı Tamamlandı.¨ November 3, 2011. 
Habertürk. ¨İfadeye Gitmeyen Dört MİT Mensubu Hakkında Yakalama Kararı.¨ 
February 10, 2012. 
Hürriyet. ¨ Özel Güvenlik Terörü.¨ November 30, 2012. 
Hürriyet. ¨17,5 milyon kişi parmaklarından tanınıyor.¨ January 13, 2014. 
Hürriyet. ¨Şimdi de tuvalet takip sistemi.¨ March 17, 2009. 
Hürriyet. ¨Suikastçi Özel Güvenlikçi Çıktı.¨ April 26, 2007. 
Milliyet. ¨Ramazan Şenliğinde Özel Güvenlik Terörü.¨ September 23, 2008. 
Radikal. ¨Osmangazi Üniversitesi’nde Protestocu Öğrencilere Özel Güvenlikten 
Müdahale.¨ March 11, 2013. 
Radikal. ¨ Yine Özel Güvenlik, Yine Ölçüsüz Şiddet.¨ December 30, 2013. 
Radikal. ¨Kuyumcu soyan üç kız kardeş yakalandı.¨ August 27, 2008. 
Radikal. ¨Temizlik İşçileri Polise Çalışacak.¨ April 26, 2012. 
Sabah. ¨Biyometrik Projesi 1 Eylül’de Başlıyor.¨ June 29, 2013. 
Zaman. ¨Fikri Sağlar: MİT Kanunu’nda Değişiklik, Hukuk Devletini Zedeler.¨          
February 14, 2012. 
